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THE TRANS ATHLETE DILEMMA:   
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS  
OF HIGH SCHOOL TRANSGENDER  
STUDENT-ATHLETE POLICIES 
MICHAEL J. LENZI* 
 Typically, high schools offer separate teams for boys and girls, but the 
increasing number of young people openly identifying as transgender (“trans”) 
has complicated this sex-segregated approach.  High school athletic associations 
across the country have adopted varied regulations regarding the eligibility of trans 
athletes:  restrictive policies require trans students to compete on teams corresponding 
to their sex at birth without exception; fully inclusive policies allow all trans students 
to compete on teams consistent with their gender identity; and partially inclusive 
policies permit trans boys to play on all-boy teams without restriction but require 
trans girls to undergo specific medical interventions before playing on all-girl teams. 
Plaintiffs challenging these policies will likely rely on Title IX of the 
Educational Amendments Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Under either claim, a high school athletic association would need to 
establish that classifying trans students by their sex assigned at birth rather than 
their gender identity—or vice versa—furthers a legitimate government interest. 
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Restrictive policies fail rational basis review because forcing female-to-male 
(FTM) trans boys to compete against girls ironically undermines notions of fair 
play.  Additionally, male-to-female (MTF) trans girls who have undergone a year of 
cross-gender hormone treatments enjoy no significant competitive edge over their 
cisgender girl peers.  Fully inclusive policies are constitutionally valid because 
creating a welcoming educational environment for trans students is a legitimate 
state objective and an athletic policy that allows trans players to compete on 
teams consistent with their gender identity is rationally related to that goal.  
Finally, partially inclusive policies, which require MTF trans girls to undergo a 
year of hormone therapy before competing on all-girl teams, are valid because a state 
athletic association may rationally determine that, without medical intervention, 
trans girls have a competitive advantage and may endanger fellow female players. 
Although partially inclusive athletic policies are legally permissible, high 
school athletic associations should pursue fully inclusive models that validate 
the dignity of trans students. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In February 2017, Mack Beggs, a transgender boy,1 won the Texas 
high school girls’ state wrestling championship amidst an uproar of 
controversy.2  Beggs, who had undergone medically prescribed 
hormone therapy since October 2015 to aid in his transition, requested 
to compete against other boys, but the University Interscholastic 
League (UIL), the state officiating body that regulates Texas 
interscholastic sports, refused his request.3  The official UIL policy 
restricts an athlete to only competing on single-sex teams that 
correspond to the sex indicated on the student’s birth certificate.4  A 
parent of a competitor filed a lawsuit alleging that Beggs’s testosterone 
treatments provided him an unfair advantage over his female 
opponents, hazarding the bizarre position that “Beggs, who has 
identified as a boy for about two years, is a girl, but somehow not 
enough of a girl to wrestle against girls.”5  Although a Texas judge 
dismissed the lawsuit,6 the Beggs controversy reveals how policies based 
                                               
 1. Beggs was born female but now identifies as male.  See infra Section I.B 
(discussing transgender identity). 
 2. Christina Cauterucci, The Trans Boy Who Won the Texas Girls’ Wrestling Title Exposes 
the Illogic of Anti-Trans Policy, SLATE (Feb. 27, 2017, 3:34 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/xx_factor/2017/02/27/the_texas_trans_boy_forced_to_wrestle_girls_exposes
_the_illogic_of_anti.html. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Michael Florek, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against UIL that Sought to Ban 
Transgender Wrestler from Competing, DALLAS NEWS:  SPORTSDAY (Apr. 25, 2017), 
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on strict sex binaries often lead to illogical results when confronted 
with the reality of fluid conceptions of gender identity.7 
On the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, some states, like 
Connecticut, allow transgender student-athletes to compete on teams 
consistent with their gender identity irrespective of their sex assigned 
at birth.8  Andraya Yearwood, a fifteen-year-old transgender girl,9 
outclassed her female competition at the 2017 Connecticut State Track 
and Field Championship, finishing first in both the 100-meter dash 
and 200-meter dash.10  Some of her competitors voiced frustration, 
believing that Yearwood’s male body—she has never undergone any 
hormone therapy that would suppress her natural testosterone levels—
provided her a biological advantage in a sport based on physical 
strength and speed.11  While the Beggs situation shows the foolishness 
of adhering to strict sex-based classifications in all circumstances, the 
controversy surrounding Yearwood exposes the possible folly of 
progressive policies that turn a blind eye to the reality of inherent 
biological differences between males and females. 
This Comment analyzes the potential constitutional challenges to 
various state regulations regarding inclusion of transgender student-
athletes on single-sex interscholastic sports teams.  Generally, public 
schools offer separate boys’ and girls’ teams for their sports programs, 
but the increasing number of young athletes identifying as transgender 
complicates this practice.12  State officials must now craft athletic policies 
that recognize the dignity of transgender adolescents but still promote 
the goals of fair competition and student safety.13  Currently, state high 
                                               
https://sportsday.dallasnews.com/high-school/high-schools/2017/04/25/judge-
dismisses-lawsuit-uil-sought-ban-transgender-wrestler-competing. 
 7. See infra Section I.B (explaining the distinction between sex and gender). 
 8. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-15c (2017) (ordering Connecticut public schools to 
provide students “an equal opportunity to participate” in school activities “without 
discrimination on account of . . . gender identity or expression”). 
 9. Yearwood was born male but now identifies as female.  See infra Section I.B 
(discussing transgender identity). 
 10. Jeff Jacobs, As We Rightfully Applaud Yearwood, We Must Acknowledge Many Questions 
Remain, HARTFORD COURANT (June 1, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.courant.com/ 
sports/hc-jacobs-column-yearwood-transgender-0531-20170530-column.html. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Jan Hoffman, Estimate of U.S. Transgender Population Doubles to 1.4 Million 
Adults, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/health/ 
transgender-population.html (explaining that, while only 0.6% of the adult 
population in America—or 1.4 million people—identifies as transgender, that number 
is twice what it was five years ago). 
 13. See infra Section II.C. 
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school athletic associations implement a wide range of regulations 
regarding the eligibility of transgender student-athletes to compete on 
single-sex teams.14  This Comment classifies these varied policies into three 
general categories:  restrictive, fully inclusive, and partially inclusive.15 
This Comment argues that restrictive policies requiring transgender 
students to participate on sports teams consistent with their sex 
assigned at birth, without exception, fail to survive rational basis review 
and are, therefore, unconstitutional.  Preventing female-to-male 
(FTM) transgender boys from playing on boys’ teams serves no rational 
purpose.16  Concerns about safety are paternalistic, and concerns about 
fair play are illogical.17  Furthermore, requiring male-to-female (MTF) 
transgender girls to play on boys’ teams in all circumstances is 
impermissibly overinclusive.18  Transgender girls who have received cross-
gender hormone treatments for more than a year pose no credible safety 
risk to female opponents and enjoy no significant competitive advantage.  
Any policy discriminating against transgender girls who are 
undergoing hormone therapy likely reflects unjustifiable animus.  
However, under rational basis review, a rule that requires a MTF 
transgender girl to undergo hormone therapy for one year before 
competing against other girls should survive a constitutional challenge.19  
Such a regulation is rationally related to the legitimate state goals of 
promoting competitive fairness and ensuring student safety. 
Part I examines the history and purpose of single-sex sports in public 
schools and explores how the inclusion of transgender student-athletes 
poses new legal complications for the current sex-segregated 
approach.  Part II details the various state policies currently concerning 
transgender high school student-athletes, focusing on restrictive, fully 
inclusive, and partially inclusive models.  Part III establishes the legal 
framework that plaintiffs would likely use to contest these state 
regulations, analyzing how courts have interpreted the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the 
Education Amendments Act to provide relief to transgender 
individuals in the past.  Part IV argues that transgender student-athlete 
policies only need to withstand rational basis review.  Finally, Part V 
                                               
 14. See infra Section II.C. 
 15. See infra Section II.C. 
 16. See infra Section I.B (defining female-to-male (FTM) transgender boy). 
 17. See infra Section V.B.1. 
 18. See infra Section I.B (defining male-to-female (MTF) transgender girl). 
 19. See infra Section V.B.3. 
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argues that state policies that restrict students to competing on single-
sex teams consistent with their sex assigned at birth, without exception, 
are constitutionally invalid; however, rules that require transgender 
girls to undergo specific forms of medical intervention before playing 
on all-girl teams likely pass constitutional muster. 
This Comment concludes by explaining that although both fully 
inclusive and partially inclusive policies are consistent with the 
Constitution and Title IX, high school athletic associations need to deeply 
consider whether they want to prioritize notions of fair competition 
over acknowledgment of the dignity and well-being of transgender 
girls who may be harmed by any policy short of full inclusion. 
I. TRANSGENDER ATHLETES AND SEX-SEGREGATED  
HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS 
This Section examines the history and purpose of single-sex sports 
teams in public schools—focusing both on cases where courts have 
upheld sex-segregated policies and cases where courts have struck 
down sex-based exclusions.  Sections I.B and I.C further explore how 
the increased visibility of trans athletes disrupts the traditional gender 
paradigm underpinning interscholastic athletics.  Finally, this Section 
concludes by explaining the importance of inclusion for the trans 
athletes at the mercy of these regulations. 
A. History and Objective of Sex Segregation in High School Sports 
Throughout American history, sports were traditionally the domain 
of boys and men.20  During the nineteenth century, religious 
institutions, schools, and businesses organized and promoted team 
sports—especially football—as a means to engender “masculine 
qualities such as physicality, aggression, and dominance in male 
participants.”21  The few athletic opportunities available to female 
athletes tended to emphasize “fitness and socializing rather than 
competition,” and sports for girls and women often had different rules 
based on stereotypical notions of female physical inferiority.22 
                                               
 20. See Erin E. Buzuvis, Transgender Student-Athletes and Sex-Segregated Sport:  
Developing Policies of Inclusion for Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Athletics, 21 SETON HALL 
J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 4 (2011). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1, 4 (noting society’s limitation of the scope of women “sporting 
practices,” including requiring “modest and restrictive attire”); see also Cape v. Tenn. 
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 563 F.2d 793, 794–95 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curium) 
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The state of female athletics forever changed in 1972 when Congress 
passed Title IX of the Education Amendments Act, which mandated 
that educational institutions receiving federal funds may not 
discriminate against students “on the basis of sex.”23  Title IX ensured 
that female students had equal opportunity and funding to participate 
in athletics, but the implementing regulations instituted a separate-
but-equal framework for female sports, explicitly authorizing schools 
to sponsor separate teams for members of each sex.24  The regulations 
stipulate that a school may even operate a single-sex team without 
offering a corresponding team for the opposite sex if (1) the sport is a 
contact sport or (2) athletic opportunities for members of the 
excluded sex have not been previously limited.25 
Under a strict reading of the regulation, a school that sponsors a 
boys’ football team but no girls’ football team is justified in prohibiting a 
female student from trying-out for football.  Similarly, a school that 
operates separate-sex teams for badminton—a noncontact sport—would 
be equally justified in prohibiting a female athlete from trying-out for the 
more competitive boys’ badminton team regardless of her skill level. 
Some feminist legal scholars have criticized Title IX, arguing that 
the legislation legitimizes unfounded sex-based discrimination and 
                                               
(holding that the modified rules made for girls’ basketball that “call for six instead of 
five players on each team, impose half-court restrictions, and permit only forwards to 
shoot” are valid because the rules are reasonably tailored to the limited physical 
characteristics and capabilities of girls). 
 23. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–82 (2012). 
 24. Title IX states in part: 
(a) General.  No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another 
person or otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic, 
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no 
recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis. 
(b) Separate teams.  Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this 
section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of 
each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the 
activity involved is a contact sport.  However, where a recipient operates or 
sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or 
sponsors no such team for members of the other sex, and athletic 
opportunities for members of that sex have previously been limited, members 
of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the 
sport involved is a contact sport.  For the purposes of this part, contact sports 
include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other 
sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact. 
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a)–(b) (2017). 
 25. Id. § 106.41(b). 
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brands girls as inferior to boys,26 much like the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson27 maintained racial segregation with its 
“separate but equal” accommodations requirement.28  Most courts, 
however, have upheld Title IX’s sex-segregated framework for 
interscholastic sports to protect athletic opportunities for girls.29  When 
school athletic policies are at odds with that end, courts routinely strike 
down sex-based exclusions.  For instance, courts typically permit 
physically talented girls to play on boys’ teams for both contact and 
noncontact sports as long as the school does not offer a corresponding 
girls’ team.30  Courts are reluctant to enforce a school athletic policy 
that completely bars girls from playing certain sports.31  For example, 
in Darrin v. Gould,32 the Supreme Court of Washington invalidated a 
policy that prevented the two Darrin sisters from trying out for the 
Wishkah Valley High School boys’ football team.33  The court held that 
such a prohibition impermissibly discriminated against the Darrin girls 
“on account of their sex.”34  The ruling in Darrin is consistent with 
similar rulings that reject the unfounded and paternalistic claim that 
prohibiting a talented girl from playing a contact sport with boys is for 
                                               
 26. See EILEEN MCDONAGH & LAURA PAPPANO, PLAYING WITH THE BOYS:  WHY 
SEPARATE IS NOT EQUAL IN SPORTS xi (2008) (“By condoning sex segregation in contact 
sports, Title IX ended up reinforcing the assumption that girls couldn’t—or 
shouldn’t—play with the boys.”); Nancy Leong, Against Women’s Sports, WASH. UNIV. L. 
REV. 5 (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2923503 (arguing that sports 
leagues should operate on the assumption that participation should be coed). 
 27. 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
494–95 (1954). 
 28. Id. at 551–52 (upholding a Louisiana statute that required railroads to provide 
separate-but-equal accommodations for white and black passengers). 
 29. See Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]t 
would require blinders to ignore that the motivation for promulgation of the 
regulation on athletics was the historic emphasis on boys’ athletic programs to the 
exclusion of girls’ athletic programs in high schools as well as colleges.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1294, 1302 (8th Cir. 1973) 
(tennis and cross country); Saint v. Neb. Sch. Activities Ass’n, 684 F. Supp. 626, 627 
(D. Neb. 1988) (wrestling); Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 
1021–22 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (eighth-grade football); Carnes v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. 
Athletics Ass’n, 415 F. Supp. 569, 570 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (baseball); Darrin v. Gould, 
540 P.2d 882, 883 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) (high school football). 
 31. See, e.g., Darrin, 540 P.2d at 892–93 (holding that a blanket rule prohibiting girls 
from playing on boys’ teams for contact sports is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 32. 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975). 
 33. Id. at 883–84. 
 34. Id. at 893. 
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her own good.35  In these cases, the female plaintiffs are aware of their 
physical abilities and are making an informed decision to compete 
against boys.36  Furthermore, the Darrin court concluded that safety 
concerns are disingenuous because schools do not prevent smaller, 
weaker boys who are prone to injury from trying-out for contact sports 
against bigger, stronger boys.37 
Courts are conflicted about whether girls are entitled to try-out for 
the more competitive boys’ team when their school offers a girls’ team 
for that particular sport.  Title IX expressly allows schools to operate 
sex-segregated sports teams,38 but schools must implement Title IX in 
a manner consistent with the Constitution.39  In O’Connor v. Board of 
Education,40 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
upheld a policy that prevented Karen O’Connor, a talented female 
basketball player, from trying-out for the sixth-grade boys’ basketball 
team because her school provided a sixth-grade team for girls.41  The 
court reasoned that without sex-segregated teams, boys would 
dominate and deny girls an equal opportunity to participate in 
interscholastic sports.42  The court conceded that the policy was 
illogical as applied to O’Connor, but it held a valid policy only needs 
to be reasonable in general, not in every specific case.43 
Contrastingly, in Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic 
Ass’n,44 a Pennsylvania state court concluded that relegating all female 
students to the girls’ team, regardless of ability, constitutes impermissible 
                                               
 35. See Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 350–51 (1st Cir. 1975) 
(concluding that safety concerns are unsubstantiated and not a rational basis for 
excluding girls from Little League Baseball). 
 36. See Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1028–29 (W.D. Mo. 
1983) (explaining that an average girl may have a higher potential for injury than the 
average boy, but not all girls are average). 
 37. See Darrin, 540 P.2d at 892 (noting that smaller, weaker boys could try-out for 
their high school’s football team). 
 38. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2017). 
 39. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255–56 (2009) (holding 
that Title IX does not preclude an Equal Protection Clause challenge alleging 
unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools). 
 40. 545 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
 41. Id. at 378, 384. 
 42. Id. at 379. 
 43. Id. at 381 (“If the classification is reasonable in substantially all of its 
applications, I do not believe that the general rule can be said to be unconstitutional 
simply because it appears arbitrary in an individual case.”) (quoting O’Connor v. Bd. 
of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 23, 449 U.S. 1301, 1306 (1980)). 
 44. 334 A.2d 839 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). 
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sex discrimination.45  The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania challenged 
the constitutionality of a provision of the Pennsylvania Interscholastic 
Athletic Association’s bylaws, mandating that “[g]irls shall not 
compete or practice against boys in any athletic contest.”46  The court 
held that such a policy was invalid with respect to sports for which no 
girls’ team exists.47  For those “boy” sports, all girls, even girls more skilled 
than their male classmates, are effectively barred from participating 
due to their sex.48  In dicta, the court further reasoned that even when 
schools offer separate teams for boys and girls for the same sport, if the 
school restricts an exceptionally talented girl to the girls’ team, she 
“still may be denied the right to play at that level of competition which 
[her] ability might otherwise permit . . . solely because of her sex.”49  The 
court recognized that preventing girls from playing against boys 
undermines the purpose of Title IX,50 ensuring that female students have 
equitable access to the educational benefits of competitive athletics. 
Following that reasoning, courts are most likely to uphold sex-
segregated athletic policies when boys sue to gain positions on girls’ 
teams.51  Because the Department of Education drafted the Title IX 
implementation regulations to increase opportunities for female 
athletes, courts have been unsympathetic to male plaintiffs relying on 
the statute.52  High schools may reasonably prevent boys from trying-
out for girls’ teams because boys have physical advantages that would 
be unfair to opposing players and would limit female participation.53  
In B.C. v. Board of Education,54 a New Jersey appellate court upheld a 
                                               
 45. Id. at 842. 
 46. Id. at 840. 
 47. Id. at 842. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 841 (addressing a challenge to the Equal Rights Amendment in the 
Pennsylvania Constitution, which, like Title IX, prohibits the “denial or abridgment of 
equality of rights because of sex”) (citing PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28). 
 51. See, e.g., Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 169 (3d Cir. 1993) (field 
hockey); Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1127 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(volleyball); B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 531 A.2d 1059, 1061 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (field 
hockey); Forte v. Bd. of Educ., 431 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (volleyball). 
 52. See Forte, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 324 (“[The] policy of preventing male participation 
in girls’ inter-scholastic teams is a discernable and permissible means toward 
redressing disparate treatment of female students in scholastic athletic programs.”). 
 53. See Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131 (concluding that, due to average physiological 
differences, “males would displace females to a substantial extent” if boys could try-out 
for the all-girl volleyball team). 
 54. 531 A.2d 1059 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). 
2018] THE TRANS ATHLETE DILEMMA 851 
 
state athletic policy that prevented a high school boy from playing on 
his school’s all-girl field hockey team even though the school did not 
sponsor a field hockey team for boys.55  The court explained that 
because boys have a real physical advantage over girls, New Jersey’s sex-
segregated athletics policy necessarily “prevents males from 
dominating and displacing females from meaningful participation in 
available athletic opportunities.”56 
Notably, there are two recorded instances in which courts have 
permitted boys to participate on girls’ teams.57  In both cases, the holdings 
were limited to situations where schools did not sponsor a boys’ team for 
the sport in question.58  For example, in Gomes v. Rhode Island 
Interscholastic League,59 the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode 
Island permitted a boy to play on an all-girl volleyball team, but the court 
recognized that typically a sex-segregated sports policy is desirable.60 
Generally, courts acknowledge that Congress passed Title IX to 
increase educational opportunities for girls and women.  As such, 
courts tend to invalidate sex-segregated athletic policies when those 
policies deny girls the opportunity to play traditionally masculine 
sports; however, courts will enforce those same policies to prevent male 
plaintiffs from ruining the integrity of female athletics. 
B. Distinguishing Sex from Gender and Understanding  
Transgender Identity 
The increasing number of young athletes identifying as transgender 
has forced education policymakers to reexamine the social purpose 
and legal justifications for sex-segregated sports teams.  For this 
Comment, “transgender” refers to an “individual whose gender identity 
                                               
 55. Id. at 1061, 1066. 
 56. Id. at 1065. 
 57. See Attorney General v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 393 N.E.2d 284, 
296 (Mass. 1979) (holding that a complete bar on boys competing on girls’ teams 
violates the Equal Rights Amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution because the 
policy is not narrowly tailored to safety concerns or providing athletic opportunities to 
girls); Gomes v. R.I. Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D.R.I. 1979) 
(concluding that because boys have been denied the opportunity to play volleyball, 
boys must be permitted to play on an all-girl team if the school does not sponsor a 
male volleyball team), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 1979). 
 58. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 393 N.E.2d at 296. 
 59. 469 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D.R.I. 1979), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 1979). 
 60. 469 F. Supp. at 666 (stating that “[s]eparate but equal volleyball teams do 
appear the most advantageous athletic approach” because of the physical differences 
between boys and girls). 
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(one’s internal psychological identification as a boy/man or 
girl/woman) does not match the person’s sex at birth.”61  An FTM 
transgender boy is a young person who was born with a female body 
but identifies as a male, and an MTF transgender girl is a young person 
who was born with a male body but identifies as a female.62  “Cisgender” 
refers to an individual who exclusively identifies as his or her sex 
assigned at birth—someone who is not transgender.63 
Although “gender” and “sex” are often used interchangeably, the 
two terms have distinct meanings.64  “Sex” describes an individual’s 
biological characteristics (e.g., chromosomes, hormone profiles, and 
internal and external sex organs), while “gender” refers to an 
individual’s personal identification as male or female based on internal 
awareness.65  Trans proclivities are deeply rooted and may present in 
children as young as two or three years old.66  Some trans individuals 
seek hormone therapy and gender-reassignment surgery to change 
their bodies to better reflect their gender identity, but others simply 
choose to live their lives as a gender different from their sex assigned 
at birth without medical intervention.67 
The steps an individual may take toward transitioning are often 
dependent upon age and physical development.68  The World 
Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) has 
established different medical protocols for transitioning dependent 
upon a trans person’s age.69  For young children, WPATH recommends a 
purely social transition free from medical intervention.70  For children 
approaching puberty, a doctor may choose to prescribe hormone blockers 
                                               
 61. PAT GRIFFIN & HELEN J. CARROLL, ON THE TEAM:  EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR 
TRANSGENDER STUDENT ATHLETES, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 9 (2010), 
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/NCLR_TransStudentAthlete%2B(2).pdf.  
Throughout this Comment, the shorthand for “transgender” is “trans.” 
 62. Id. 
 63. GLAAD Media Reference Guide – Transgender, GLAAD, 
https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).  
Throughout this Comment, the shorthand for “cisgender” is “cis.” 
 64. Jill Pilgrim et al., Far from the Finish Line:  Transexualism and Athletic Competition, 
13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 495, 498 (2003). 
 65. Id. at 497–98. 
 66. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 12–13. 
 67. GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 61, at 9. 
 68. Id. at 13–14. 
 69. WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE 
HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 11, 17–
21 (7th ed. 2011) [hereinafter WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE]. 
 70. Id. at 17. 
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to delay the onset of puberty.71  For postpubescent adolescents, a doctor 
may prescribe cross-gender hormone treatments and in some cases may 
approve chest reconstruction surgery for trans boys.72  Importantly, most 
doctors advise against gender reassignment surgery for patients under 
eighteen, and most insurers refuse to cover the procedure for minors.73 
C. The Dilemma of Transgender Athletes 
Trans athletes pose a dilemma to the traditional model of 
interscholastic athletics because the sex-segregated approach is 
predicated upon the assertion that males and females are biologically 
different.  Males, on average, have objective physical advantages over 
females.74  Males have longer arms, bigger and stronger legs, and more 
muscle fiber.75  Although no significant physical differences exist 
between boys and girls prior to puberty, the physical disparities 
between the sexes become more pronounced once students enter high 
school.76  For example, the 2017 Maryland High School Class 4A Track 
and Field Championship highlights the extent of these sex-based 
distinctions.  In the 100-meter dash, the three fastest girls ran an 
average time of 12.22 seconds, while the three fastest boys ran an 
average time of 10.88 seconds.77  The three top girl long jumpers 
jumped an average distance of eighteen feet, one inch, compared to 
an average distance of twenty-one feet, five inches for the top three 
boys.78  In both events, every male competitor—except for those 
disqualified—outperformed every female competitor.79  Without 
separate events for each sex, female sprinters and jumpers would not 
have a realistic opportunity to compete for a state championship. 
                                               
 71. Id. at 18–19. 
 72. Id. at 20–21. 
 73. Id. at 21; see also Anemona Hartocollis, How Young Is Too Young to Seek Gender 
Reassignment?, HERALD-TRIBUNE (July 7, 2015), http://health.heraldtribune.com/ 
2015/07/07/how-young-is-too-young-to-seek-gender-reassignment (“While no law 
prohibits minors from receiving sex-change hormones or even surgery, insurers have 
generally refused to extend coverage for these procedures to those under 18.”). 
 74. See Scott Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections for 
Transgender Student Athletes, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 271, 286 (2013). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 287. 
 77. MD. PUB. SECONDARY SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, MARYLAND STATE CHAMPIONSHIPS 
RESULTS 1, 13 (2017), http://www.mpssaa.org/assets/1/6/T_F_4A_Final_Results_17.pdf. 
 78. Id. at 10, 21–22. 
 79. Id. at 1–24. 
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Erin Buzuvis, a preeminent scholar on transgender athletes, argues 
that the perceived competitive advantage males have over females is 
overstated.  She notes that the reported physical differences between the 
sexes reflect averages, not categorical distinctions.80  Furthermore, skill 
and talent, which are the most important factors when determining an 
advantage in sports, are not always related to size and strength.81  
Buzuvis’s assertion that not all boys possess physical advantages over all 
girls is correct, but the categorical distinctions between the sexes are 
pronounced enough that a policy that fully embraces sex-integrated 
high school athletics would disenfranchise young women.  Some 
especially talented girls could compete against their male peers, but 
many girls of average size and strength would be discouraged from 
participating in athletics.  Sex-segregated teams may not be necessary 
for interscholastic sports that are predominantly skill-based, like 
bowling or archery, but boys have an undue competitive advantage in 
most other sports, which privilege body size, speed, and strength. 
Before high school athletic associations devise regulations regarding 
transgender athletes, they must openly acknowledge the inherent 
biological differences between males and females.  A trans girl, who 
has a male body that regularly produces testosterone, has a physical 
advantage over a cis girl whose body produces significantly less 
testosterone.82  However, when a trans girl receives cross-gender 
hormone therapy, the treatments greatly reduce any former biological 
edge.83  Hormone treatments for MTF trans girls increase body fat, 
decrease muscle mass, and may even cause a slight loss in height.84  
After only one year of cross-gender hormone therapy, a trans girl will 
have estrogen and testosterone levels similar to the average cis girl.85  
Yet some physiological differences persist even after a trans girl has 
undergone hormone therapy.  Her “male” skeletal structure—
                                               
 80. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 35–36. 
 81. Id. at 37–38; see also Leong, supra note 26, at 36–38 (noting that men have no 
inherent competitive advantage in sports based primarily on skill like skeet shooting 
or in extreme endurance sports like ultra-marathons and the Iditarod). 
 82. See Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 38. 
 83. Id. at 38–39; see also Joanna Harper, Race Times for Transgender Athletes, 
6 J. SPORTING CULTURES & IDENTITIES 1, 2, 8 (2015) (conducting the first ever study 
measuring the performance of transgender athletes and finding that for distance 
runners in masters (over forty years old) track meets, “transgender women run 
distance races at approximately the same level, for their respective gender, both before 
and after gender transition”). 
 84. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 39. 
 85. Id. 
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including basic height, hip structure, arms, hands, legs, and feet—will 
remain unchanged.86  A trans girl’s comparatively larger stature may 
be an advantage in sports like basketball and volleyball that favor height 
and hand size.87  These differences are less pronounced for a trans girl 
who began cross-gender hormone therapy as a teenager before her male 
skeletal structure fully developed.  Concerns regarding competitive 
fairness are especially baseless for MTF trans girls who were placed on 
hormone blockers before they reached puberty and never developed 
male secondary sex characteristics.  Unlike hormone therapy, there is 
currently no evidence that suggests gender reassignment surgery has a 
demonstrable impact on athletic performance.88 
Obviously, fairness concerns are less of an issue when trans boys with 
female bodies seek the opportunity to compete against cis boys.89  Even 
FTM trans boys who regularly take testosterone treatments enjoy no 
discernable physical advantage over cis boys.90  A trans boy who takes 
testosterone may technically be in violation of a school’s doping or anti-
drug rules, but a policy granting a medical exception for a student 
receiving prescribed testosterone treatments—assuming his testosterone 
levels remain in the typical range for a cis boy—is a commonsense solution.91 
                                               
 86. Maddie Deutsch, Information on Estrogen Hormone Therapy, UNIV. OF CAL. S.F., 
https://transcare.ucsf.edu/article/information-estrogen-hormone-therapy (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2018) (explaining that any slight loss in height a trans woman may notice 
after undergoing hormone therapy is not due to skeletal changes but “due to changes 
in the ligaments and muscles of your feet”). 
 87. But see Katelyn Burns, What Actually Happens when a Trans Athlete Transitions, 
VICE SPORTS (May 4, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
vv95a4/what-actually-happens-when-a-trans-athlete-transitions (arguing that a trans 
girl’s larger skeletal stature may actually be a disadvantage due to her loss in quickness, 
as the reduction in testosterone results in a smaller motor powering a larger body).  
Also, some trans girls are smaller than the average cis girl, and some cis girls are larger 
than the average cis boy.  See id.  These arguments notwithstanding, athletes with larger 
bodies tend to enjoy an advantage in physical sports. 
 88. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 40–41. 
 89. See Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that the Arizona Interscholastic Association had a substantial interest in 
preventing the decrease of athletic opportunities for females because males have a 
physiological undue advantage when competing against females). 
 90. Pilgrim et al., supra note 64, at 531. 
 91. Id. 
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D. Potential Benefits of Athletic Participation for Transgender Students 
Roughly 8 million students participate in and enjoy the physical, 
mental, and academic benefits associated with interscholastic athletics.92  
Playing sports reduces an adolescent’s risk of heart disease and obesity, 
while also establishing a healthy exercise routine that may persist into 
adulthood.93  Sports promote mental health, leading to lower rates of 
depression and anxiety.94  Student-athletes also tend to have increased 
rates of school attendance and better grades.95  Finally, high school 
athletics instill the values of dedication, teamwork, and sportsmanship.96 
Transgender students are an especially vulnerable population,97 and 
they deserve equal access to the benefits of high school athletics.  Trans 
students may feel marginalized and isolated from their school 
community, and sports can provide a sense of belonging.98  When a 
single-gender team openly accepts a trans player, the student’s gender 
identity is powerfully validated.  Matt Dawkins, a trans high school 
sprinter from New Jersey, sacrificed potential scholarships to run 
women’s college track to participate on the boys’ team for his high 
school.99  Matt knew that fully living as a male—being “in the bro 
group”—was more important to his self-worth than being the fastest 
runner on the track.100  For many trans students, trans-inclusive policies 
are a matter of life and death.  A staggering forty-one percent of 
                                               
 92. High School Sports Participation Increases for 27th Consecutive Year, NAT’L FED’N OF 
STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASS’NS (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.nfhs.org/articles/high-
school-sports-participation-increases-for-27th-consecutive-year (noting that 7,868,900 
high school students across the United States participated in interscholastic sports 
during the 2015–2016 school year). 
 93. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 46 (explaining that studies have found links between 
physical activities and reduced risk of obesity, diabetes, and heart disease); Skinner-
Thompson & Turner, supra note 74, at 297 (describing how sports participation 
develops long-term habits). 
 94. Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 74, at 297. 
 95. Id. at 298. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 48; see also Johanna Olson-Kennedy, Mental Health 
Disparities Among Transgender Youth:  Rethinking the Role of Professionals, 170 JAMA 
PEDIATRICS 423, 423 (2016) (noting that transgender youth report 
“[d]ispropotionatley high levels of depression, anxiety, substance use, social isolation, 
self-harm, and suicidality”). 
 98. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 48–49. 
 99. Matt Dawkins’ Incredible Journey, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/video/ 
clip?id=18326395 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
 100. Id. 
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transgender individuals attempt suicide,101 but trans youth who have a 
strong support system are eighty-two percent less likely to self-harm.102  
Nondiscriminatory athletic policies have the potential to quite literally 
save the lives of trans individuals. 
II.  CURRENT POLICIES FOR INCORPORATING TRANSGENDER ATHLETES 
INTO SEX-SEGREGATED SPORTS 
This Section details the current trans athlete inclusion policies of 
different sports governing bodies, focusing on the Olympic model, the 
college model, and the regulations of various state high school athletic 
associations. 
A. Olympic Model 
The International Olympic Committee (IOC)103 drafted its first 
transgender inclusive policy in 2003.104  Prior to that, the IOC required 
sex-verification testing for all female athletes.105  Instead of uncovering 
cases of gender fraud, sex-verification tests typically resulted in 
humiliating and unfairly excluding women with intersex conditions.106  
In fact, many athletes only became aware of an intersex condition 
                                               
 101. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN:  A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. AND NAT’L 
GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE 2 (2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/ 
downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf. 
 102. Mark L. Hatzenbuehler, The Influence of State Laws on the Mental Health of Sexual 
Minority Youth, 171 JAMA PEDIATRICS 322, 322 (2017) (“Stigma is one of the most 
frequently hypothesized risk factors for explaining sexual orientation disparities in 
suicide outcomes.”); Brynn Tannehill, The Truth About Transgender Suicide, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 14, 2015, 4:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brynn-tannehill/the-
truth-about-transgend_b_8564834.html. 
 103. See MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION 269–70 (4th ed. 
2017) (explaining that the IOC, an international non-governmental not-for-profit 
organization, is the supreme authority concerning the Olympic Games, but the 
International Olympic Committee must rely on the agreement of the various international 
sports federations and National Olympic Committees to enforce its decisions). 
 104. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 22. 
 105. Id. at 21. 
 106. Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 74, at 289; see also GRIFFIN & CARROLL, 
supra note 61, at 9–10 (explaining that people with intersex conditions are born with 
mixed sexual characteristics).  Although minors with intersex conditions deserve 
recognition, respect, and equal access to interscholastic athletics, it is beyond the scope 
of this Comment to examine policies concerning how to integrate these adolescents’ 
equitably into the current single-sex framework of high school athletics. 
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because of the testing.107  In 2004, the IOC adopted the first modern 
policy allowing transgender individuals to compete in athletic 
competitions consistent with their gender identity.108  The rigid 
guidelines required that transgender athletes undergo gender 
reassignment surgery, take cross-gender hormones consistently for two 
years after surgery, and obtain official government recognition of their 
altered gender status before they could participate in events consistent 
with their new gender identity.109 
In 2015, the IOC revised its policy to better align with contemporary 
notions of gender.  The current modified guidelines, which the IOC 
recommends international sports federations adopt but does not 
officially mandate, no longer require gender reassignment surgery.110  
According to the IOC policy, an FTM trans man is “eligible to compete 
in the male category without restriction”; however, an MTF trans woman 
can only compete in a women’s event after completing hormone 
therapy.111  The IOC requires that a trans woman maintain testosterone 
levels at a suppressed rate “for at least [twelve] months prior to her first 
competition.”112  Since a trans woman typically needs to take hormones 
consistently for at least one year before her testosterone levels are 
sufficiently suppressed, the rule is essentially a two-year requirement.113 
                                               
 107. See Leong, supra note 26, at 26–27 (detailing the case of eighteen-year-old 
South African sprinter Caster Semenya, who was publicly embarrassed after a tabloid 
leaked the results of a sex-verification test that revealed her latent intersex condition). 
 108. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 21. 
 109. Id. at 22. 
 110. Chelsea Shrader, Comment, Uniform Rules:  Addressing the Disparate Rules that 
Deny Student-Athletes the Opportunity to Participate in Sports According to Gender Identity, 
51 U. RICH. L. REV. 637, 659–60 (2017). 
 111. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., IOC CONSENSUS MEETING ON SEX REASSIGNMENT AND 
HYPERANDROGENISM 2 (2015), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/ 
Commissions_PDFfiles/Medical_commission/2015-11_ioc_consensus_meeting_on_ 
sex_reassignment_and_hyperandrogenism-en.pdf. 
 112. Id. at 2. 
 113. See IOC Rules Transgender Athletes Can Take Part in Olympics Without Surgery, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2016, 8:04 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jan/ 
25/ioc-rules-transgender-athletes-can-take-part-in-olympics-without-surgery 
(explaining that a trans woman may have to undergo hormone therapy for one or two 
years before the level of male testosterone in her blood falls below the IOC required 
10 nanomols per liter threshold). 
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B.  College Athletics Model 
In 2011, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a 
private association of member colleges and universities,114 adopted a 
trans-athlete inclusion policy similar to that of the IOC.  Before 2011, 
the NCAA policy stipulated that trans athletes must compete on the 
single-sex team consistent with their state recognized sex.115  But 
because states have varying policies for changing sex identification on 
birth certificates and driver’s licenses, this regulation led to the 
application of inconsistent standards.116  The current trans-inclusive 
NCAA policy establishes different criteria for trans men and trans 
women.117  An FTM trans man can compete on a men’s team at any 
point; however, a trans man can only compete on a women’s team if 
he is not undergoing testosterone treatment.118  An MTF trans woman 
can compete on the men’s team without restriction; however, a trans 
woman can only compete on a women’s team after completing one 
calendar year of cross-gender hormone therapy.119  Some trans women 
may opt to apply for a medical hardship waiver, known as a “medical 
redshirt,” to avoid losing a year of eligibility during the required twelve 
months of hormone therapy.120 
                                               
 114. See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 103, at 107, 171 (explaining that NCAA member 
institutions promulgate extensive rules to maintain academic integrity, amateurism, 
and competitive fairness to which all voluntary member institutions must abide or risk 
sanctions); see also NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 194–95 (1988) (holding that the 
NCAA is not a state actor and the NCAA’s rules enforcement processes are not subject 
to constitutional constraints). 
 115. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 23; Anne L. DeMartini, Thirty-Five Years after Richards 
v. USTA:  The Continued Significance of Transgender Athletes’ Participation in Sport, in SPORT 
AND THE LAW:  HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL INTERSECTIONS 111 (Samuel O. Regalado & 
Sarah K. Fields eds., 2014) (commenting that, before 2011, the NCAA’s position on 
trans student-athletes required athletes to compete according to the gender 
designated on state identification). 
 116. See Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 23–24 (“This patchwork of state laws creates the 
possibility that an NCAA member institution could—consistent with NCAA policy—
field a women’s team that includes an athlete from Massachusetts who identifies as 
female but has not undergone sex reassignment surgery, but not a similarly situated 
athlete from Rhode Island.”). 
 117. PAT GRIFFIN & HELLEN CARROLL, NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER STUDENT-
ATHLETES 13 (2010), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/2bc3fc_44693cb5d779311 
cabc005d959e9486d.pdf. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Shrader, supra note 110, at 662; see also Bylaws, Article 14, NAT’L COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASS’N, https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/bylawView?id=8900 (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2018) (stating that the Transgender Female Exception in section 14.2.2.3 of the 
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C. High School Model  
High school athletic associations, comprised of representatives from 
public and private secondary schools, draft and implement statewide 
interscholastic athletics regulations.121  School boards and local 
officials may also adopt rules that apply to specific school districts.122  
High school athletic associations are considered state actors because 
these organizations are pervasively “entwined” with the state.123 
Currently, seven state athletic associations have no recorded 
guidelines regarding the integration of trans student-athletes, and the 
state associations that have addressed the issue have drafted widely 
varying regulations.124  These varied transgender student-athlete 
policies have been grouped into three classifications:  restrictive, fully 
inclusive, and partially inclusive. 
1.  Restrictive policies 
Restrictive policies limit trans student-athletes to competing on 
single-sex sports teams that correspond to their sex assigned at birth.  
For example, in Alabama, “participation in athletics [is] determined 
by the gender indicated on the student-athlete’s certified certificate of 
birth.”125  A trans athlete in Alabama is essentially barred from 
participating on a sports team that aligns with his or her gender 
identity because altering a birth certificate in Alabama requires an 
                                               
bylaws provides that a trans female may be eligible for a two-semester extension if the student-
athlete uses testosterone suppression treatment or surgical intervention for two semesters). 
 121. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 103, at 22–23. 
 122. Id. at 23. 
 123. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298–
302 (holding that the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association was entwined 
with the state because eighty-four percent of the Association schools are public, public 
school officials act as Association representatives, student participation in sports 
sponsored by the Association satisfy state physical education requirements, and some 
of the ministerial staff are treated as state employees and receive public pensions).  But 
see MITTEN ET AL., supra note 103, at 24 (cautioning that the holding in Brentwood was 
fact-specific and “may not be determinative as to all high school athletic associations, 
given that the history, structure, and activities of high school athletic associations and 
the degree of public or state involvement differ from state to state”). 
 124. High School Transgender Athlete Policies, TRANSATHLETE.COM, 
https://www.transathlete.com/k-12 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (describing the 
transgender-athlete guidelines for various state high school athletic associations). 
 125. 2012–13 CASE STUDIES:  ALABAMA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 
(AHSAA) 14 (2012–2013), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/2bc3fc_87536da66cad 
4d6195ae056a573e67da.pdf. 
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irreversible “surgical procedure”126 that doctors advise against for 
minors.  Texas, Mack Beggs’s home state, has a similar policy:  athletes 
are restricted to participating on single-sex teams that are consistent 
with the sex indicated on their birth certificate.127  Although Texas 
does not require gender reassignment surgery, the process to alter 
one’s birth certificate in Texas is expensive and time-consuming.128  
Ultimately, birth certificate alteration is granted or withheld at the 
discretion of an individual judge.129  For these two states, and others with 
similar restrictive policies,130 trans athletes are effectively prevented from 
playing on single-sex sports teams that match their gender identity. 
2.  Fully inclusive policies 
In stark contrast, fully inclusive policies allow trans student-athletes 
to participate on single-sex sports teams consistent with their gender 
identity in virtually all circumstances.  For example, in Connecticut, 
where Andraya Yearwood currently runs track, athletes are “permitted 
to participate in sex-segregated athletic activities based on their gender 
identity.”131  Washington state has a similar fully inclusive policy, 
stipulating that “[a]ll students should have the opportunity to 
participate in . . . activities in a manner that is consistent with their 
gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on a student’s 
                                               
 126. ALA. CODE § 22-9A-19(d) (2017). 
 127. John Wright, Texas Districts Pass UIL Restriction on Trans Athletes, OBSERVER (Feb. 25, 
2016, 2:49 PM), https://www.texasobserver.org/trans-student-athlete-uil-discrimination. 
 128. Morgan Shell, Comment, Transgender Student-Athletes in Texas School Districts:  
Why Can’t the UIL Give All Students Equal Playing Time?, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043, 1067, 
1069–71 (2016) (explaining how individuals seeking to change their gender may hire 
a lawyer and file a petition to a judge who has discretion to hear it). 
 129. Id. at 1070. 
 130. See, e.g., IND. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, INC., BY-LAWS & ARTICLES OF 
INCORPORATION 229 (2017) (requiring student-athletes to participate based on their 
birth gender); LA. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, LHSAA GENDER EQUITY POSITION 
STATEMENT 164 (2017) (requiring student-athletes to compete based on the gender on 
their birth certificate); Matt Comer, New High School Athletics Gender Rule May Cause 
Discrimination, QNOTES (May 8, 2014), https://goqnotes.com/29224/new-high-
school-athletics-gender-rule-may-cause-discrimination (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) 
(explaining the North Carolina High School Athletic Association’s new rule that 
denotes gender based on the student’s birth certificate). 
 131. CONN. SAFE SCHOOL COAL., GUIDELINES FOR CONNECTICUT SCHOOLS TO COMPLY 
WITH GENDER IDENTITY AND EXPRESSION NON-DISCRIMINATION LAWS 9, 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/2bc3fc_906b9d9cbfa6c81a4ffd5f11e4eef3ce.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
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records.”132  However, in Washington, a student-athlete’s gender 
identity is subject to a “bona fide” requirement.133  If a competing 
school were to challenge the authenticity of an athlete’s trans status, a 
board of officials would review the claim to assess whether the 
individual’s trans identity is sincerely held.134 
3.  Partially inclusive policies 
Finally, some state high school athletic associations have implemented 
partially inclusive policies that, in some circumstances, require trans 
student-athletes to undergo medical intervention before competing on a 
team consistent with their gender identity.  For example, the Idaho High 
School Athletic Association follows the current NCAA guidelines by 
allowing an FTM trans athlete to participate on a boys’ team at any 
time, but an MTF trans athlete must undergo a full year of hormone 
therapy before she can compete on a girls’ team.135 
Similarly, Ohio has a regulation that requires an MTF trans girl to 
complete one year of hormone therapy before competing against cis girls; 
however, Ohio grants exceptions on a case-by-case basis.136  An MTF trans 
girl receiving no medical intervention may play on an all-girl team if she can 
demonstrate to the Commissioner’s Office by way of sound medical 
evidence that the transgender female student athlete does not 
possess physical (bone structure, muscle mass, testosterone, 
                                               
 132. WASH. INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES ASS’N, 2017–18 OFFICIAL HANDBOOK 32 
(2017), http://www.wiaa.com/conDocs/Con1629/2017-18%20HANDBOOK%20Web.pdf. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. The Idaho High School Athletic Association adopted a Transgender Student 
Participation Policy, which provides: 
A.  A female-to-male transgender student athlete who is taking a medically 
prescribed hormone treatment under a physicians[’] care for the purposes of 
gender transition may participate only on a boys[’] team. 
B.  A male-to-female transgender student athlete who is not taking hormone 
treatment related to gender transition may participate only on a boys[’] team. 
C.  A male-to-female transgender student athlete who is taking medically 
prescribed hormone treatment under a physicians[’] care for the purposes of 
gender transition may participate on a boys[’] team at any time, but must 
complete one year of hormone treatment related to the gender transition 
before competing on a girls[’] team. 
IDAHO HIGH SCHOOL ACTIVITIES ASS’N, BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING 3 (2013), 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/2bc3fc_abe99582bf754cb799b7da48b6981646.pdf. 
 136. OHIO HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASS’N, TRANSGENDER POLICY 2–3 (2014), 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/2bc3fc_10cff228b57342ccb91e4913253d8234.pdf 
[hereinafter OHIO POLICY]. 
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hormonal, etc.) or physiological advantages over genetic females of 
the same age group.137 
Ohio also stipulates that trans boys receiving hormone treatment must 
undergo regular medical testing to ensure their testosterone level is 
within a range typical for “an adolescent genetic boy.”138 
Because high school athletic associations across states have adopted 
inconsistent trans student-athlete policies, these governing bodies are 
vulnerable to potential lawsuits.  Both trans athletes, who are barred 
from participation due to restrictive policies, and cis athletes, who are 
put in competition against trans athletes due to inclusive policies, 
could pursue litigation. 
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A trans plaintiff challenging a discriminatory high school athletic 
policy will likely rely on both the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education Amendments 
Act.139  This Section explains how courts are likely to navigate each of 
these challenges.  Section III.A provides the legal framework and level 
of judicial scrutiny courts use to decide Equal Protection Clause claims 
involving (1) fundamental rights, (2) suspect classifications, (3) quasi-
suspect classifications, and (4) non-suspect classifications.  Section 
III.B explores whether Title IX’s prohibition against sex-based 
discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of gender identity 
and whether trans plaintiffs may bring a successful Title IX claim based 
on a theory of sex-stereotyping discrimination.  Section III.B.3 
discusses how courts have addressed the sex-stereotyping question in 
the context of public school bathrooms and locker rooms. 
A.  Equal Protection Clause Jurisprudence 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits 
states from enacting laws that treat its residents differently for reasons 
                                               
 137. Id. at 3. 
 138. Id.; see also Charlize Veritas, Men vs. Women—Hormones—A Transgender 
Perspective, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2016, 8:51 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/charlize-veritas/men-vs-women-hormones-a-
t_b_9234380.html (explaining that the testosterone level for a typical cis male under 
nineteen years of age ranges from 240–950 nanograms per deciliter, and the 
testosterone level for a typical cis female ranges from 8–60 nanograms per deciliter). 
 139. See infra Sections III.A–B. 
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that do not further a legitimate government purpose.140  When 
assessing a potential equal protection violation, a court must first 
determine the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny:  strict scrutiny,141 
intermediate scrutiny,142 or rational basis review.143  Courts subject 
government policies to heightened judicial scrutiny when those policies 
infringe upon fundamental rights or rely on suspect classifications.144 
1.  Substantive due process and fundamental rights 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the “liberty” interests 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment145 
extend beyond the rights clearly delineated in the Bill of Rights or the 
practices of states at the time of adoption.146  Through the substantive 
due process principle, the Court has recognized that the Constitution 
protects a number of fundamental rights, including the right to privacy 
concerning consensual sexual activity,147 the right to marriage,148 and 
the right to reproductive autonomy.149 
When a state restricts an individual’s access to a fundamental right, 
the policy must withstand strict scrutiny, meaning the government 
action must serve a compelling purpose and be the least restrictive 
means of doing so.150  Access to interscholastic sports, however, is not 
a constitutionally recognized fundamental right.151  In fact, the 
                                               
 140. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o 
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 141. See infra Section III.A.2. 
 142. See infra Section III.A.3. 
 143. See infra Section III.A.4. 
 144. See infra Sections III.A.1–3. 
 145. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o 
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 146. Id.; see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (explaining 
that the protections provided in the Bill of Rights extend to any restraints on freedom). 
 147. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating a Texas law 
criminalizing consensual homosexual conduct). 
 148. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (ruling that state laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage are unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967) (striking down state anti-miscegenation laws prohibiting interracial marriage). 
 149. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55 (1972) (invalidating a Massachusetts 
statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals). 
 150. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1973). 
 151. See, e.g., Walsh v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 616 F.2d 152, 159–60 (5th Cir. 
1980) (explaining that a student’s interest in playing interscholastic sports “amounts 
to a mere expectation rather than a constitutionally protected claim of entitlement” 
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Supreme Court has consistently held that even access to public 
education generally is not considered a fundamental right.152 
2.  Suspect classifications and strict scrutiny 
When no fundamental right is at stake, a court then analyzes 
whether the government policy discriminates against a suspect class.153  
Because government policies that discriminate on the basis of race or 
national origin typically reflect prejudice, such suspect classifications 
need to withstand strict scrutiny review.154  Namely, a court will uphold 
a racially discriminatory law only if the law is “suitably tailored to serve 
a compelling state interest.”155  Because “[r]acial classifications are simply 
too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between 
justification and classification,”156 even affirmative action policies 
benefiting minorities must withstand strict scrutiny.  In Gratz v. 
Bollinger,157 the Supreme Court struck down the University of Michigan’s 
undergraduate admissions policy that automatically awarded twenty 
points toward admission to minority applicants, holding that such a 
policy “is not narrowly tailored to achieve the [state’s] interest in 
educational diversity.”158  Strict scrutiny review is so exacting that most 
laws subjected to this standard fail, leading Justice Marshall to quip that 
conventional strict scrutiny review is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”159 
                                               
and is not protected by due process); Kulovitz v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 462 F. Supp. 875, 
877 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (“Participation in interscholastic athletics is not a constitutionally 
protected civil right.”). 
 152. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 35 (“Education, of course, is not among the rights 
afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.  Nor do we find any basis 
for saying it is implicitly so protected.”); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 230 
(1982) (cautioning that “[p]ublic education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by 
the Constitution,” even though the Court found a Texas statute excluding 
undocumented immigrant children from attending public schools unconstitutional). 
 153. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) 
(listing race, alienage, and national origin as suspect classifications vulnerable to 
pernicious discrimination). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 157. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 158. Id. at 270.  But see Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207, 2214 (2016) 
(holding that the University of Texas’s undergraduate affirmative action policy 
withstands strict scrutiny review because a student’s race is only a “factor of a factor of 
a factor” when admissions officers evaluate applicants). 
 159. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).  Contra Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (dispelling “the notion that strict 
scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact’”). 
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3.  Quasi-suspect classifications and intermediate scrutiny 
Statutes that discriminate on the basis of sex, a “quasi-suspect” 
classification, need to withstand a slightly less stringent intermediate 
scrutiny review.160  To survive intermediate scrutiny, a sex classification 
“must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”161  The 
Supreme Court has held that a statute is invalid if the objective of the 
statute “reflects archaic and stereotypic notions” about sex.162  If the 
objective of the legislation is to “protect” women because they are 
presumed “innately inferior” to men, “the objective itself is 
illegitimate.”163  In United States v. Virginia,164 the Supreme Court held 
that the Equal Protection Clause precluded the Virginia Military 
Institute (VMI), a public military college, from refusing to admit 
women.165  Virginia argued that if women were admitted, VMI would 
need to modify its rigorous curriculum because most women would 
not thrive in an “adversative” environment.166  The Court, however, 
rejected this overbroad generalization, concluding that such notions 
are “self-fulfilling prophecies.”167  Similarly, in Mississippi University for 
Women v. Hogan,168 the Court ruled in favor of a man seeking admission 
to a women’s professional nursing school.169  The Court held that the 
school’s admission policy is impermissible because it “lends credibility 
to the old view that women, not men, should become nurses.”170 
Sex-discriminatory policies are valid, though, when sex classification 
is “not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes 
are not similarly situated in certain circumstances.”171  In Michael M. v. 
Superior Court of Sonoma County,172 the Supreme Court upheld a 
California statutory rape law that holds only males criminally liable for 
                                               
 160. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982). 
 163. Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–85 (1973) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 164. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 165. Id. at 519. 
 166. Id. at 542–43. 
 167. Id. 
 168. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
 169. Id. at 722–23. 
 170. Id. at 730. 
 171. Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 462, 469 (1981). 
 172. 450 U.S. 462 (1981). 
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engaging in sex with a minor.173  The Court reasoned that because the 
consequences of teenage pregnancy essentially fall only on girls, the 
state was justified in passing a statutory rape law that punishes only 
men, “who, by nature, suffer[] few of the consequences of [their] 
conduct.”174  The holding in Michael M. established that the Equal 
Protection Clause does not require courts to disregard the 
“physiological differences between men and women.”175 
Besides prohibiting direct sex-based discrimination, the Equal 
Protection Clause also prohibits discrimination based on gender 
stereotype.176  A state regulation that punishes individuals because they 
fail to conform to typical gender norms must also withstand 
intermediate scrutiny.177  Trans plaintiffs have successfully relied on a 
sex-stereotyping theory to challenge discriminatory policies.  For 
example, in Glenn v. Brumby,178 Glenn, an MTF trans woman, 
successfully sued her boss Brumby for wrongful termination when 
Brumby fired her after she began to outwardly transition from a man 
to a woman.179  The Eleventh Circuit held that Brumby’s termination 
of Glenn from her position at the Georgia General Assembly’s Office 
of Legislative Counsel constituted impermissible sex-based 
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment because it was 
based on Glenn’s failure to conform to traditional gender roles.180  
Furthermore, the court added in dicta that Brumby’s decision to 
terminate Glenn may have been upheld under rational basis review, 
but the action did not withstand intermediate scrutiny.181  In certain 
circumstances, trans discrimination is sex discrimination and 
necessarily must be subjected to heightened review.182 
4. Non-suspect classifications and rational basis review 
Finally, when a government classification is neither suspect nor 
quasi-suspect, the classification merely needs to be “rationally related 
                                               
 173. Id. at 475–76. 
 174. Id. at 473. 
 175. Id. at 481 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 176. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 177. Brumby, 663 F.3d at 1315–16. 
 178. 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 179. Id. at 1314–15, 1321. 
 180. Id. at 1321. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1317. 
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to a legitimate state interest.”183  Under rational basis review, a 
regulation is valid as long as the court can conceive of any legitimate 
purpose for enacting it.184  In Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 
Inc.,185 an illustrative example of judicial deference to lawmakers under 
rational basis review, the Court upheld an Oklahoma law that made it 
illegal for anyone other than a licensed optometrist to fit eyeglass 
lenses.186  The law negatively affected unlicensed opticians who were 
prohibited from performing the relatively simple process of grinding 
lenses to fit eyeglass frames.187  The Court reasoned that even though 
the regulation harms opticians and may exact a “needless, wasteful 
requirement in many cases,” the law survives rational basis review 
because it could conceivably encourage people to have more frequent 
eye examinations, which is rationally related to the legitimate state 
interest of public health and welfare.188 
However, if the court believes that a classification is “born of 
animosity toward the class of persons affected,” a policy that implicates 
neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right may be ruled 
constitutionally invalid.189  Legal scholars have referred to this slightly 
more exacting standard as “rational basis with bite.”190  For example, 
in Romer v. Evans,191 the Court struck down an amendment to the 
Colorado Constitution that prohibited municipalities from passing 
laws that would protect individuals from discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.192  The amendment effectively repealed the 
ordinances of several Colorado cities, which banned discrimination 
based on sexual orientation in housing, employment, education, 
public accommodations, and health and welfare services.193  The Court 
found that the immense harm the amendment inflicted on the gay 
                                               
 183. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 184. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“[T]he law 
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional.  It is 
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that 
the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”). 
 185. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 186. Id. at 491. 
 187. Id. at 486. 
 188. Id. at 487. 
 189. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). 
 190. See, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite:  Intermediate Scrutiny 
by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779–80 (1987). 
 191. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 192. Id. at 635–36. 
 193. Id. at 623–24. 
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community outweighed any legitimate state interest.194  Similarly, in 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,195 the Court struck down 
a provision of the Food Stamp Act that denied food stamps to 
households of unrelated persons.196  The legislative history suggested 
Congress passed the provision in an effort to prevent “hippie 
communes” from participating in the food stamp program.197  The 
Court stated in no uncertain terms that a “desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.”198  
Thus, even under rational basis review, a policy that is primarily 
motivated by animus will not pass constitutional muster. 
B. Title IX Jurisprudence 
Along with an Equal Protection Claim, a trans plaintiff challenging 
the legality of a restrictive athletic policy will likely bring a claim under 
Title IX.  Section III.B.1 explains how the executive branch has failed 
to provide consistence guidance on whether discrimination on the 
basis of gender identity violates Title IX’s prohibition against sex-based 
discrimination; Section III.B.2 details how some trans plaintiffs have 
found Title IX relief through a sex-stereotyping theory of gender 
discrimination; and Section III.B.3 discusses the outcome of similar 
sex-stereotyping arguments in cases about trans restrictive bathroom 
and locker room policies. 
1. The executive branch’s interpretation of “on the basis of sex” in Title IX 
Title IX prevents discrimination “on the basis of sex” in educational 
institutions that receive federal funds.199  Determining the meaning of 
“on the basis of sex” in Title IX will be central to any impending 
Title IX challenge to transgender student-athlete policies.200  The 
executive branch has given inconsistent guidance for interpreting “on 
the basis of sex” over the past two years.201  In its first attempt at issuing 
                                               
 194. Id. at 635. 
 195. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 196. Id. at 534–35. 
 197. Id. at 534. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2012). 
 200. Id. § 1681(a). 
 201. See generally G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 719 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 
137 S. Ct. 1239 (2016) (explaining that Auer deference “requires that an agency’s 
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation be given controlling weight unless the 
interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation or statute”).  In 
reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court issued a one-sentence opinion: “Judgment 
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guidance, on May 13, 2016, President Barack Obama’s administration 
issued a Dear Colleague Letter202 informing public schools that, for the 
purposes of Title IX, sex discrimination encompasses discrimination 
based on gender identity:  “When a school provides sex-segregated 
activities and facilities, transgender students must be allowed to 
participate in such activities and access such facilities consistent with 
their gender identity.”203  The letter also directly mentioned how a 
school should integrate trans students into athletics: 
A school may not . . . adopt or adhere to requirements that rely on 
overly broad generalizations or stereotypes about the differences 
between transgender students and other students of the same sex 
(i.e., the same gender identity) . . . [but] Title IX does not prohibit 
age-appropriate, tailored requirements based on sound, current, 
and research based medical knowledge . . . .204 
Although the letter was largely a victory for transgender students, 
the guidance still allowed a school to prevent trans student-athletes 
from participating on single-sex teams that align with their gender 
identity if the prohibition was based on “sound, current, and research-
based medical knowledge.”205  In a footnote in the Dear Colleague 
Letter, the Obama administration applauded the NCAA’s only partially 
inclusive trans student-athlete policy, noting that NCAA officials 
“consulted with medical experts, athletics officials, affected students, 
and a consensus report entitled, On the Team:  Equal Opportunity for 
Transgender Student Athletes” to write its guidelines.206 
Yet any hope trans activists may have had that the executive branch’s 
progressive interpretation of “sex” in Title IX could be weaponized to 
                                               
vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for 
further consideration in light of the guidance document issued by the Department of 
Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 2017.”  137 S. Ct. at 1239. 
 202. Emma Brown, U.S. Senator:  Education Dept. Overstepped Authority on Sexual 
Assault Complaints, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/education/wp/2016/01/07/u-s-senator-education-department-overstepped-
authority-on-sexual-assault-complaints (noting that Dear Colleague Letters are considered 
administrative guidance, which agencies promulgate to clarify regulations that already 
exist, and are not new regulations which require soliciting and responding to public input). 
 203. U.S. Dep’t of Education & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Dear Colleague” Letter:  
Transgender Students (May 13, 2016), https://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ 
letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at n.18.  But see GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 61, at 24–31 (distinguishing in 
their On the Team report between high school and collegiate athletics by recommending a 
partially inclusive model for colleges but a fully inclusive model for high schools). 
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invalidate trans-discriminatory policies was dashed when President 
Donald J. Trump rolled back the guidance of his predecessor.  On 
February 22, 2017, the Trump administration released its own Dear 
Colleague Letter making the following statement: “[Transgender 
access to sex-segregated facilities and activities] is an issue best solved 
at the state and local level.  Schools, communities, and families can 
find—and in many cases have found—solutions that protect all 
students.”207  The Trump administration’s Dear Colleague Letter 
further declared that the Department of Education and Department 
of Justice have decided to “withdraw and rescind” the Obama 
administration’s former guidance on trans student inclusion.208 
Without clear guidance from the executive branch regarding whether 
trans discrimination constitutes sex-based discrimination, trans plaintiffs 
will likely turn to a theory of discrimination based on sex stereotyping. 
2.  Title IX protections against sex stereotyping discrimination 
Even if courts are reluctant to interpret “sex” in Title IX to mean 
gender identity, the statute still protects transgender individuals from 
certain forms of gender-based discrimination.  Similar to the Equal 
Protection Clause jurisprudence,209 transgender students are protected 
under Title IX because schools may not discriminate against an 
individual based on his or her failure to conform to sex stereotypes.210  
In Miles v. New York University,211 the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that Jennifer Miles, a trans woman, 
could sue under Title IX for sexual harassment even though she is 
biologically male.212  The court emphasized that Title IX “does not 
                                               
 207. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Educ., U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos Issues 
Statement on New Title IX Guidance (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/ 
press-releases/us-secretary-education-betsy-devos-issues-statement-new-title-ix-
guidance; see also U.S. Dep’t of Education & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Dear Colleague” Letter 
(Feb. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Trump Dear Colleague Letter], https://www.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201702-title-ix.docx (stating that the U.S. 
Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice “believe that . . . there 
must be due regard for the primary role of the States and local school districts in 
establishing educational policy”). 
 208. Trump Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 207. 
 209. See supra Section III.A.3 (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause prohibits 
discrimination based on sex stereotypes). 
 210. See generally Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 151–52 
(N.D.N.Y. 2011) (asserting that a male student who was harassed due to his perceived 
sexual orientation had a valid Title IX claim under a sex-stereotyping theory). 
 211. 979 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 212. Id. at 249–50. 
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[permit] expressing disapproval of conduct involved in the 
transformation from one gender to another.”213  Again, in certain 
situations trans discrimination is sex discrimination.214 
When assessing Title IX claims, courts often rely on Title VII 
jurisprudence.215  Title VII protects employees from sex-based 
employment discrimination.216  Like Title IX and the Equal Protection 
Clause, Title VII applies to individuals who are discriminated against 
because they do not conform to stereotypical gender roles.217  In the 
landmark Supreme Court case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,218 a woman 
was impermissibly denied a promotion because she acted too 
“macho.”219  Her superiors told her she needed to walk, talk, and dress 
more “femininely” to rise through the corporate ranks.220  In Price 
Waterhouse, the Court stated that sex stereotyping is a form of sex-based 
discrimination:  “[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could 
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group . . . .”221 
In Smith v. City of Salem,222 the Sixth Circuit relied on the sex-
stereotyping theory established in Price Waterhouse to provide Title VII 
relief to a transgender firefighter who was terminated after she 
outwardly transitioned from a man to a woman.223  The court held that 
Smith had a valid claim under Title VII when her employer 
discriminated against her because her appearance and mannerisms 
failed to conform to masculine sex stereotypes.224 
                                               
 213. Id. at 249. 
 214. See supra Section III.A.3 (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits 
discrimination against trans individuals based on a sex-stereotyping theory). 
 215. See Murray v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(“[I]n a Title IX suit for gender discrimination based on sexual harassment of a 
student, an educational institution may be held liable under standards similar to those 
applied in cases under Title VII.”). 
 216. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) 
(stating that it is an “unlawful employment practice” if an employer discriminates 
against employees based on an employee’s sex). 
 217. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
 218. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 219. Id. at 233, 235. 
 220. Id. at 235. 
 221. Id. at 251–53. 
 222. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 223. Id. at 572. 
 224. Id. at 575 (“[A] label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination 
claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-
conformity.”). Throughout the opinion, the court used masculine pronouns to refer 
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Trans individuals challenging a restrictive athletic policy will likely 
argue that, like the plaintiffs in Miles and Smith, they were discriminated 
against due to their failure to conform to traditional gender norms. 
3.  Title IX and transgender student bathroom and locker room access 
Because no court has ruled directly on whether a restrictive trans 
student-athlete policy violates Title IX, courts will likely turn to recent 
cases regarding trans students’ access to bathroom and locker room 
facilities for guidance.  These access cases have turned on whether the 
court views a restrictive bathroom policy as discriminating against 
transgender students based on their failure to conform to sex 
stereotypes.225  The distinction is important because it determines the 
level of scrutiny a court will apply:  courts consider sex stereotyping to 
be a form of sex discrimination, and any sex-discriminatory policy must 
withstand intermediate review.226 
Federal courts have split on whether the cases concerning trans 
access should be decided under intermediate scrutiny or rational basis 
review.  In Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh,227 the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that a university policy 
that prohibited a trans man from using campus locker rooms 
designated for males was not discriminatory under Title IX.228  The 
court noted that when a trans student uses a locker room designated 
for the opposite biological sex, that student’s action “does not 
constitute a mere failure to conform to sex stereotypes.”229  The court 
reasoned that impermissible sex stereotyping occurs when a plaintiff is 
discriminated against because his or her behavior deviates from the 
expected behavior of someone of the plaintiff’s sex.230  A policy that 
prevents a trans man from using the university’s men’s locker room, 
                                               
to Smith, a transgender woman, and identified Smith as being “biologically and by 
birth a male.”  Id. at 568. 
 225. Compare Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 
1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that trans-restrictive bathroom policies are 
unconstitutional based on a theory of sex stereotyping), with Johnston v. Univ. of Pitt., 
97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 680 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (finding that trans-restrictive locker room 
policies do not reflect sex stereotyping). 
 226. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (granting a 
transgender employee relief under intermediate scrutiny rather than rational basis 
review); supra Section III.B.2 (discussing sex stereotyping). 
 227. 97 F. Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015). 
 228. Id. at 661, 682. 
 229. Id. at 681 (quoting Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 230. Id. at 680. 
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conversely, is not based on “behaviors, mannerisms, and 
appearances.”231  The restriction is based on a person’s genitals, not 
how a person outwardly looks, dresses, or acts.232  Accordingly, the 
court concluded the restrictive locker room policy was not sex-based 
discrimination under a sex-stereotyping theory, and the policy only 
needs to withstand rational basis review.233 
The court further held that the locker room policy was 
constitutionally valid because universities may rationally prevent trans 
men from using the men’s locker room facility to further the legitimate 
objective of protecting student privacy.234 
In 2017, the Seventh Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in 
Whitaker v. Kenosha.235  In Whitaker, the court found that a restrictive 
high school bathroom policy “punishe[d]” transgender students for 
their “gender nonconformance.”236  The court, relying on the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Smith v. City of Salem, reasoned that “the School 
District treats transgender students like [Whitaker], who fail to conform 
to the sex-based stereotypes associated with their assigned sex at birth, 
differently.”237  Because this was an instance of sex discrimination based 
on a sex-stereotyping theory, the court subjected the school’s bathroom 
policy to a heightened level of intermediate scrutiny.238  The court 
conceded that ensuring student privacy is an important state objective, 
but it held that the practice of preventing a trans boy from using the 
boys’ restroom is not substantially related to achieving that goal.239 
                                               
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 681. 
 233. Id. at 668. 
 234. See id. at 678 (explaining that students need access to facilities which exclude 
individuals of the opposite biological sex “to perform certain private activities and 
bodily functions”). 
 235. 858 F.3d 1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 236. Id. at 1049. 
 237. Id. at 1048, 1051 (relying on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Smith v. City of Salem, 
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)).  But see infra Section IV.C (arguing that the Seventh 
Circuit misapplied Smith’s reasoning in Whitaker and that restrictive bathroom policies 
do not discriminate against trans students based on their gender nonconformity). 
 238. 858 F.3d at 1051. 
 239. Id. at 1051, 1054. 
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IV.  TRANSGENDER ATHLETE POLICIES ONLY NEED TO WITHSTAND 
RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW 
This Section argues that high school athletic association regulations, 
which classify students by their sex assigned at birth rather than their 
gender identity, only need to withstand rational basis review. 
Section IV.A explains that participation in interscholastic sports is 
not a fundamental right, so a state actor can deny a student access to 
athletics without establishing a compelling reason.  Section IV.B argues 
that transgender identity is not a suspect classification requiring 
heightened judicial scrutiny.  There are significant biological differences 
between males and females, and, in certain circumstances, a state actor 
may justifiably classify people by genetic markers of sex rather than 
gender identity.  Finally, Section IV.C argues that trans-restrictive 
athletic policies do not punish trans individuals for failing to conform 
to expected gender stereotypes—a type of discrimination that would 
need to withstand intermediate scrutiny.  Instead, restrictive athletic 
policies treat trans individuals differently from cis individuals due to 
their hormone profiles. 
But, even under rational basis review, a court could invalidate a 
trans-restrictive athletic policy that is based primarily on animus toward 
trans people. 
A. Transgender Students Do Not Have a Fundamental Right to 
Participate in Interscholastic Athletics 
A state policy that restricts access to a fundamental right must be 
subject to exacting strict scrutiny, but courts will not adopt this 
standard of review because participation in high school sports is a 
privilege, not a right.240  A trans student challenging a restrictive 
athletic policy under a substantive due process claim will likely fail.241 
B. Transgender Identity Is Likely Not a Suspect Classification 
Likewise, a plaintiff challenging a trans-restrictive athletic policy 
under a suspect classification theory will likely fail.  Equal Protection 
Clause jurisprudence suggests that trans identity is not a suspect or 
quasi-suspect classification that requires heightened judicial review.242 
                                               
 240. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 241. See id. (explaining that even access to public schooling is not a fundamental 
right guaranteed by the Constitution). 
 242. See supra Section III.A.3; see also Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051 (noting that the court 
did not need to determine whether transgender status warrants heightened scrutiny). 
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Currently, there is no U.S. Supreme Court case categorizing trans 
individuals as a suspect class,243 and the Court has been hesitant to 
acknowledge new suspect classifications.244  If the Court were to tackle 
this issue, it would need to address the following considerations: 
(1) whether trans identity is based on immutable characteristics; 
(2) whether the trans community has the ability to protect itself through 
the political process; (3) whether trans people have historically been 
discriminated against; and (4) whether discrimination against trans 
individuals likely reflects prejudice rather than purpose.245 
The immutability of trans identity is complicated.  Many activists 
argue that trans individuals diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder 
(GID)—currently classified as Gender Dysphoria—have a “psychological 
disorder that is considered inherited or unchangeable.”246  Yet WPATH 
resists classifying “transgenderism” as a medical disorder.247  By rejecting 
a medical diagnosis, WPATH’s position suggests internal conceptions 
of gender are fluid, not fixed.248  Ironically, debunking the myth of 
strict gender binaries may have weakened the argument that trans 
individuals deserve a protected legal status. 
Likewise, the question of political power is not clear cut.  Inarguably, 
trans people lack representation in high-ranking government 
positions,249 and conservative politicians have frequently tried to gin up 
                                               
 243. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99 (2015) (invalidating 
a law prohibiting same-sex marriage under a theory that the right to marry is 
fundamental under the Due Process Clause).  Although Obergefell affirmed the dignity 
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) individuals, the Supreme Court did not 
recognize sexual orientation or transgender status as a suspect classification. Id. 
 244. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445–46 (1985) 
(refusing to recognize the mentally disabled as a quasi-suspect class). 
 245. Shell, supra note 128, at 1059. 
 246. Id. at 1060–61. 
 247. See WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 69, at 4 (7th ed. 2011) (insisting 
that transgender identity is a matter of diversity, not pathology). 
 248. Id. at 2, 5 (explaining that standards of care must be “flexible” to meet the 
specific needs of the individual and reaffirming that treatment for gender dysphoria 
varies based on the person’s needs). 
 249. See Antonio Olivo, Danica Roem of Virginia to Be First Openly Transgender Person 
Elected, Seated in a U.S. Statehouse, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/danica-roem-will-be-vas-
first-openly-transgender-elected-official-after-unseating-conservative-robert-g-
marshall-in-house-race/2017/11/07/d534bdde-c0af-11e7-959c-
fe2b598d8c00_story.html (reporting that Danica Roem, who was elected to the 
Virginia House of Delegates on November 7, 2017, will be “the first openly 
transgendered person elected to and seated in a U.S. state legislature”). 
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political support from their base by attacking the trans community.  
For example, in a contentious debate surrounding a trans-restrictive 
bathroom law in Houston, Texas, Republican operatives released 
inflammatory television ads implying that trans women are sex offenders 
and pose a danger to children.250  Significantly, these trans-phobic tactics 
have been met with swift and powerful political resistance.  Former 
Republican governor of North Carolina Pat McCrory lost his re-election 
campaign in 2016 largely due to his public defense of a trans-restrictive 
bathroom law.251  In July 2017, President Trump attempted a similar 
political gambit, tweeting that he would ban trans people from serving 
“in any capacity in the U.S. Military.”252  A Trump administration 
official posited that the announcement forces Senate Democrats in 
Rust Belt states who are up for re-election in 2018 “to make their 
opposition to this a key plank of their campaigns.”253  President Trump 
may think targeting trans individuals is an easy way to flip Democratic 
seats in the Senate, but the fate of former Governor Pat McCrory shows 
he may be underestimating the political clout of trans-rights activists.254 
The case for historical discrimination against trans individuals, 
though, is fairly straightforward.  Trans people have routinely been the 
victims of harassment and hate crimes, causing disproportionally high 
rates of suicide among the trans population.255  Many states lack legal 
protections for trans workers, and trans people are twice as likely to be 
unemployed and live in poverty.256  Fifty-three percent of trans 
individuals also report being discriminated against or disrespected in 
                                               
 250. Aaron Blake, “It Will Be Fun to Watch [Democrats] Have to Defend This”:  Why 
Trump’s Transgender Military Ban Should Frighten GOP, WASH. POST (July 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/07/26/why-trumps-
decision-to-ban-transgender-people-from-the-military-should-frighten-republicans. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Four district courts issued rulings blocking President Trump’s ban—decisions 
upheld by both the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals—and the 
Trump administration has decided not to pursue a Supreme Court challenge.  As of 
January 1, 2018, trans people are authorized to enlist and serve openly in all branches 
of the U.S. military.  See U.S. Military to Accept Transgender Recruits on Monday:  Pentagon, 
REUTERS (Dec. 29, 2017, 2:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-
transgender/u-s-military-to-accept-transgender-recruits-on-monday-pentagon-
idUSKBN1EN1LV. 
 255. Shell, supra note 128, at 1060. 
 256. Id. 
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places of public accommodation like hotels, restaurants, buses, 
airports, and government agencies.257 
Ultimately, the case for categorizing trans individuals as a suspect 
class and granting the group protected status will turn on the fourth 
point in the analysis:  whether a government actor would likely have a 
plausible reason to classify people by their sex assigned at birth rather 
than their gender identity.  Equal Protection Clause case law suggests 
that a government actor might have a legitimate purpose for doing so.  
In Michael M., which concerned the California statuary rape law that 
only punished men, the Court acknowledged that statutes are valid 
when gender classification is “not invidious, but rather reflects the 
reality that men and women are not always similarly situated.”258  True 
biological differences exist between males and females, and 
accordingly, the government is justified in treating the sexes differently 
in certain situations.259  Because a government actor may have an 
important reason to classify individuals according to biological sex, 
logically, a government actor may also have a legitimate reason to 
classify individuals according to biological markers of sex—like 
hormone profiles and sex organs—rather than an individual’s internal 
sense of gender.  Thus, a court is not likely to consider transgender 
identity a suspect classification. 
C. Transgender Athlete Restrictions Do Not Discriminate Against Trans 
Students Based on Sex Stereotypes 
Even if transgender individuals are not considered a suspect class, a 
trans-restrictive athletic policy would still need to withstand a heightened 
level of intermediate scrutiny if the court determines the policy 
discriminates against trans students based on their gender nonconformity.  
The bathroom and locker room cases show that courts are divided on this 
issue.  Johnston held that trans-restrictive bathroom policies do not reflect 
sex-serotyping discrimination, and Whitaker held the exact opposite.260 
The Whitaker court, however, was wrong:  trans-restrictive bathroom 
policies do not punish trans people for failing to conform to typical 
gender norms.  In Whitaker, the court based its holding on a 
                                               
 257. Grant, supra note 101, at 5. 
 258. Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981). 
 259. See id. at 472–73 (holding that a law that punishes boys but not girls for 
engaging in sex with a minor is justified because girls, due to their biology, suffer the 
possible consequence of pregnancy and boys do not). 
 260. See supra Section III.B.3. 
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misapplication of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Smith.261  In Smith, 
the court presupposed that the MTF trans plaintiff was still biologically 
a man.262  After she transitioned, her dress and mannerisms no longer 
conformed to the behavior of a traditional man.263  To find gender 
discrimination through a sex-stereotyping theory, the court ironically 
needed to view the trans plaintiff as an effeminate man rather than an 
actual woman.264  For this reason, the court used male pronouns to 
refer to Smith throughout the opinion.265  Discrimination based on 
sex-stereotyping would therefore only occur if an FTM trans boy was 
denied access to the girls’ restroom or locker room at his high school 
because he did not outwardly look, dress, or behave as a typical girl. 
Impermissible stereotypes need to be premised on behaviors, not 
inherent biological traits.  The Whitaker court essentially took the 
position that the bathroom policy restricting trans students was 
impermissible because the school district was relying on the 
“stereotype” that a boy needs to have male genitalia to be considered 
a boy, and a girl needs to have female genitalia to be considered a girl.  
This interpretation stretches the understanding of stereotype so far 
that classifications relying on any biologically based sex differences could 
be deemed invalid.  A government policy creating separate bathroom 
facilities for men and women needs to withstand intermediate scrutiny 
and substantially further an important government objective.  But a 
government policy that classifies trans individuals by their sex assigned 
at birth rather than their gender identity only needs to be rationally 
related to a legitimate government purpose. 
Yet, even under rational basis review, a policy based on animus is 
void.  Although the Johnston court was correct in concluding that 
restrictive bathroom policies do not discriminate against trans students 
based on sex-serotypes,266 the court was wrong to hold such policies 
constitutionally valid.  A restrictive bathroom policy is neither 
                                               
 261. See Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 
1048–49 (7th Cir. 2017) (analyzing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) 
and explaining that the discrimination Smith, the transgender firefighter, faced would 
not have occurred “but for the victim’s sex”). 
 262. See 378 F.3d at 568 (referring to Smith as “biologically and by birth a male”). 
 263. See id. at 574 (noting Smith’s “contra-gender behavior”). 
 264. Id. at 572. 
 265. See Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048 n.5 (“We will use the masculine pronoun to refer 
to the Smith plaintiff for the purpose of clarity, as this is how the Sixth Circuit referred 
to the Smith plaintiff throughout its opinion.”). 
 266. Johnston v. Univ. of Pitt., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 681–82 (W.D. Pa. 2015). 
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rationally related to safety concerns nor privacy concerns.  No evidence 
suggests that a trans boy using the boys’ bathroom creates a safety risk 
for the trans student or his cis peers.267  If school administrators were 
to seriously address the concern that students sharing a bathroom with 
classmates of the opposite biological sex is unsafe because such an 
arrangement would trigger dangerous sexual responses, they would 
need to exclude gay students from shared bathrooms, as well.268 
Privacy concerns are likewise irrational.  Individuals have a right to 
bodily privacy such that “his or her nude or partially nude body, 
genitalia, and other private parts are not exposed to persons of the 
opposite biological sex”;269 however, common sense dictates that 
people use the bathroom discreetly, and students concerned with 
privacy—trans and cis alike—can use a stall to prevent others from 
seeing them exposed.270  Privacy concerns are especially suspect 
considering modern-day high school students rarely, if ever, use 
bathroom or locker room facilities in a manner in which their genitals 
are visible to others.  Finally, schools that have implemented trans 
inclusive bathroom and locker room policies have not been inundated 
with student complaints about privacy violations.271 
Instead of promoting safety or privacy objectives, these policies 
stigmatize trans students, causing them severe psychological distress.272  
Similar to the amendment to the Colorado Constitution at issue in 
Romer, trans-restrictive bathroom policies inflict “immediate, 
continuing, and real injuries [on trans students] that outrun and belie 
any legitimate justifications that may be claimed.”273  School boards 
may proffer any number of flimsy rationales, but the true motivation 
seems to be animosity toward trans individuals.  Accordingly, under 
“rational basis with bite,” policies that prohibit trans people from using 
                                               
 267. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 719 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 
137 S. Ct. 1239 (2016) (noting that school boards are often vague about precisely 
whom these policies endanger). 
 268. See id. at 723–24 n.11 (dismissing the dissent’s theory that potentially 
dangerous sexual responses justify prohibiting trans students from using bathrooms 
consistent with their gender identity). 
 269. Id. at 734. 
 270. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1052 
(7th Cir. 2017). 
 271. Id. at 1055. 
 272. Id. at 1045. 
 273. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
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bathroom facilities consistent with their gender identity should be 
deemed unconstitutional.274 
Although trans athlete regulations will similarly need to withstand 
rational basis review, the merits of such a potential legal challenge are 
not the same.  Athletic policies serve a purpose different from 
bathroom policies, and as such, they require a different set of legal 
considerations. 
V. ANALYZING THE MERITS OF POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES TO 
STATE TRANSGENDER STUDENT-ATHLETE POLICIES 
A. Potential Arguments for Imposing Transgender Restrictions 
If a court were to hear a case challenging a high school trans student-
athlete policy, the case would likely turn on four main considerations:  
(1) whether the individual challenging the policy is an MTF trans girl or 
an FTM trans boy; (2) whether the single-sex team in question is currently 
designated as all-girl or all-boy; (3) the physical characteristics of the 
specific trans student challenging the policy; and (4) whether that 
plaintiff is likely to enjoy a real or perceived competitive advantage.275  
Schools defending restrictive trans athlete policies will likely lean on 
the same arguments school administrators use to defend legal 
challenges to sex-segregated interscholastic sports more generally. 
1. Preserve athletic opportunities for girls 
School officials may contend that restricting trans athletes from 
participating on sports teams consistent with their gender identity is 
necessary to preserve opportunities for cis girls.276  This argument is 
unpersuasive.  Allowing trans girls to compete against cis girls will not 
undermine Title IX’s purpose of providing athletic opportunities for 
females.  Courts are divided over whether allowing boys to play on girls’ 
teams would substantially limit athletic opportunities for girls,277 but since 
                                               
 274. See id. at 632 (finding the amendment’s “sheer breadth . . . so discontinuous with the 
reasons offered for it that . . . it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests”). 
 275. Pilgrim et al., supra note 64, at 528. 
 276. See Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(asserting that if boys were permitted to play on the girls’ volleyball team, “athletic 
opportunities for women would be diminished”). 
 277. Compare Attorney General v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 393 N.E.2d 
284, 294 (Mass. 1979) (holding that fears of athletically superior boys “swamping” girls’ 
teams if a male plaintiff is permitted to play softball were irrational), with B.C. v. Bd. of 
Educ., 531 A.2d 1059, 1066 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (holding that allowing the 
882 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:841 
 
relatively few adolescents identify as trans,278 there is no reason to think 
that trans girls will take substantial athletic opportunities away from cis girls. 
2. Shield boys from potential stigma 
Some officials may defend an athletic policy that prohibits a trans 
boy from playing on a boys’ team as a means of protecting cis boys from 
the stigma of losing to a perceived “girl.”  Courts have roundly rejected 
similar arguments used to prevent cis girls from competing against boys.279  
Simply put, the law cannot give legal effect to private prejudice.280 
3. Safeguard against gender fraud 
Schools may also argue that policies based on strict sex binaries are 
necessary to prevent potential gender fraud.  Conceivably, a cis boy 
could fake a trans identity to exploit trans-friendly policies and 
compete against less-athletic girls.  This line of reasoning is entirely 
unsubstantiated.  Over its forty-year history of sex-verification testing, 
the IOC found zero instances of gender fraud.281  Arguments about 
gender fraud profoundly misunderstand the concept of gender 
identity.  The desire to transition is authentic,282 and any belief that a 
cis boy would subject himself to anti-trans prejudice to gain a 
                                               
male plaintiff to play on the girls’ field hockey team would “deny[] females the right 
to have equality of athletic opportunities with their male counterparts”). 
 278. See JODY L. HERMAN ET AL., AGE OF INDIVIDUALS WHO IDENTIFY AS TRANSGENDER 
IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2017) (estimating that only 0.7% of American youth ages thirteen 
to seventeen, or about 150,000 individuals, would identify as transgender if asked). 
 279. See Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Kan. 1996) (“[I]t is not the 
duty of the school to shield students from every situation which they may find 
objectionable or embarrassing due to their own prejudices.”). 
 280. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) (holding that the potential 
harms related to the social stigmatization of growing up in a mixed-race family are 
impermissible grounds upon which to base a decision in a child custody hearing). 
 281. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER 
STUDENT-ATHLETES 8 (2011), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/ 
Transgender_Handbook_2011_Final.pdf; Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra 
note 74, at 289; see also Vanessa Heggie, Sex Testing and the Olympics:  Myths, Rumours 
and Confirmation Bias, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2012, 10:21 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/the-h-word/2012/aug/02/sex-testing-
olympics-myths-rumours-confirmation-bias (discussing confirmation bias and how 
suspicions of gender fraud often are proven inaccurate). 
 282. GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 61, at 15 (“Gender identity is a core aspect of a 
person’s identity, and it is just as deep seated, authentic, and real for a transgender 
person as for others . . . .  For many transgender people, gender transition is a 
psychological and social necessity.”). 
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competitive edge is not based on any credible evidence.283  Furthermore, 
if gender fraud is an actual concern, school officials could adequately 
address the problem by including a clause requiring that a student-
athlete’s gender identity be sincerely held.284  If a competitor were to 
challenge the authenticity of a student’s trans status, the trans-athlete 
would simply need to provide evidence that his or her gender identity 
has been consistently asserted in a uniform matter. 
4. Prevent injury 
Schools will also likely attempt to justify restrictive trans-athlete 
policies by citing concerns over student safety.  No legitimate safety 
concern justifies preventing trans boys from playing on boys’ teams.  
Courts, like the Supreme Court of Washington in Darrin, typically 
permit cis girls to play against boys.285  Some girls are physically strong 
enough to compete against boys,286 and the female plaintiffs in these 
cases are making a deliberate decision to take on the risk of injury.287  
Similarly, a trans boy who has a biologically female body is making an 
informed choice to assume the risk of competing against his male 
peers.  Since schools do not bar small, injury-prone cis boys from 
competing over safety concerns,288 there is no justifiable reason for 
schools to bar trans boys. 
However, cis girls may have legitimate safety concerns when required 
to compete against trans girls in contact sports.  A trans girl may be 
bigger and stronger than her cis competitors, which could pose a 
potential risk of injury in sports like wrestling, boxing, or mixed-
martial arts.289  Weight classes may offset this danger slightly, but a state 
                                               
 283. Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 74, at 288. 
 284. Id. at 289. 
 285. Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 893 (Wash. 1975) (permitting the Darrin sisters 
to try-out for the boys’ high school football team). 
 286. See id. at 892 (“There is no finding that what may be true of the majority of girls 
is true in the case of the Darrin girls . . . or girls like them.”). 
 287. See, e.g., B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 531 A.2d 1059, 1066 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) 
(“[W]hen a girl tries out for a boys’ team, she and her parents go in ‘with their eyes open.’”). 
 288. See Darrin, 540 P.2d at 892 (relying on this reasoning to reject the proposition 
that safety concerns necessitate prohibiting all girls from trying-out for football). 
 289. See, e.g., Ben Popper, Fighting Fallon Fox:  The Controversial Science of Transgender 
Athletes in Combat Sports, VERGE (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2013/3/21/4131174/fallon-fox-mma-science-transgender-fighting-athletes (detailing 
the controversy over Fallon Fox, an MTF transgender mixed martial arts fighter, who 
some critics argue poses a safety risk to her female competitors). 
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may have a legitimate safety concern that justifies rules preventing trans 
girls from competing against cis girls in these high-contact sports.290 
5. Promote competitive fairness 
Finally, schools will likely argue that restrictive trans-athlete policies 
are necessary to maintain a fair playing field.  This argument is 
unconvincing when deployed to prevent trans boys from playing on 
boys’ teams.  If anything, a trans boy is at a disadvantage competing 
against naturally larger and stronger cis boys.  But a state may have a 
legitimate interest in monitoring trans boys currently undergoing 
hormone treatment to ensure that their testosterone levels do not 
exceed the typical limit. 
State athletic associations may have legitimate fairness concerns that 
justify rules preventing trans girls from participating on all-girl teams.  
Due to natural size and strength advantages, trans girls could unfairly 
dominate their cis girl competition.  In B.C. v. Board of Education, the New 
Jersey appellate court held that average physiological differences 
between biological males and biological females justified a rule 
prohibiting a boy from joining the girls’ field hockey team.291  Unlike 
the previous circumstance where an FTM trans boy is actively choosing to 
subject himself to a possible competitive disadvantage, cis girls did not 
choose to compete against opponents with male bodies.292  However, the 
potential social benefits trans girls receive by playing on girls’ teams could 
outweigh these concerns.293  Regardless, requiring trans girls to 
undergo hormone therapy to reduce natural hormonal advantages 
may adequately address concerns over fair play, especially considering the 
trans girls in question would have necessarily begun hormone treatments 
before their “male” skeletal structures fully developed.294 
                                               
 290. Contra Leong, supra note 26, at 41 (arguing that girls may enjoy some physical 
advantages when wrestling against boys in their weight class, such as increased 
flexibility and lower center of gravity). 
 291. B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 531 A.2d 1059, 1065 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). 
 292. See id. at 1066 (explaining that these girls are put in an unfair position because 
“they must either compete against [biological] boys or forfeit the game”). 
 293. Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 74, at 298–99 (describing the 
potential psychological harm inflicted on trans students who are forced to participate 
in single-sex activities inconsistent with their gender identity). 
 294. See GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 61, at 16 (clarifying that any competitive 
advantage a trans girl may have as a result of prior testosterone levels “dissipate[s] after 
about one year of estrogen therapy”). 
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B. Likely Results of Legal Challenges to State Transgender  
Student-Athlete Policies 
Throughout the country, high school athletic associations have 
implemented disparate regulations regarding the inclusion of trans 
athletes on single-sex sports teams: (1) restrictive policies require trans 
students to compete on teams corresponding to their sex in virtually 
all circumstances; (2) fully inclusive policies allow trans students to 
compete on teams consistent with their gender identity; and 
(3) partially inclusive policies permit trans boys to play on boys’ teams 
without restriction but require trans girls to undergo specific medical 
interventions before playing on girls’ teams. 
This Section analyzes the merits of potential legal challenges to each 
approach.  First, restrictive policies are unconstitutional because 
requiring FTM trans boys to play on girls’ teams is not rationally related 
to ensuring student safety and contributes to competitive inequity.  
Furthermore, trans girls who have received hormone treatments for 
more than a year enjoy no significant competitive advantage over cis 
girls, and a policy that restricts these trans athletes to the boys’ team 
reflects impermissible animus toward trans students.  Second, fully 
inclusive policies are constitutionally valid because this approach is 
rationally related to creating a welcoming school culture for trans 
students, which is a legitimate state object. Third, partially inclusive 
policies are also constitutionally valid because the typical trans girl who 
has not received any medical intervention could have a size and 
strength advantage over cis girls, and restricting her to the boys’ team 
is rationally related to promoting player safety and ensuring fair play. 
1. Restrictive policies 
Restrictive policies, like those implemented in Alabama and Texas, are 
constitutionally invalid.  As previously stated, a trans student-athlete policy 
must withstand rational basis review to comply with the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX.295  To be valid, the 
discriminatory policy must be rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose,296 but rules that force trans athletes to compete 
on single-sex teams based on their sex assigned at birth in virtually all 
circumstances fail even this minimal requirement. 
                                               
 295. See supra Part IV. 
 296. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985) 
(holding that the City of Cleburne had no rational reason to deny a permit that would 
enable Cleburne Living Center to operate a group home for the mentally disabled). 
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Preventing FTM trans boys from playing on boys’ teams serves no 
rational purpose.  Because trans boys are willing to assume the 
potential risk of competing against other boys, concerns over safety are 
unfounded.  Likewise, concerns over potential stigma cis boys may face 
losing to a trans boy are irrelevant because the law cannot give legal 
effect to such prejudice.297  Finally, concerns over fair play are patently 
illogical.  In fact, as Mack Beggs’s undefeated wrestling season makes 
clear, a policy requiring trans boys to play on girls’ teams undermines 
notions of fair play and potentially harms female athletes.  Federal 
courts have routinely permitted girls to play on boys’ football and 
wrestling teams,298 so there is no valid reason a trans boy should not 
enjoy that same right.  Even for sports like soccer, which a school 
typically offers teams for each gender, relegating a trans boy to the 
girls’ team regardless of his ability level is unconstitutional.  As the 
Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n court explained, such a policy 
denies a trans boy the right to compete at a high level “solely because 
of [his biological] sex.”299  Just as VMI’s male-only admissions policy 
was based on overbroad generalizations about women, trans-restrictive 
athletic policies are grounded on fixed notions about the capabilities 
of adolescents born with female bodies.300 
Restrictive policies are also invalid because requiring MTF trans girls 
to alter their birth certificates to participate on all-girl teams is 
unconstitutionally overinclusive.  In Moreno, the Supreme Court 
explained that some classifications are so imprecise that the 
classification “is wholly without any rational basis.”301  Although trans 
girls may have physiological advantages over their cis peers, trans girls 
who have received hormone treatments for over a year enjoy no 
significant competitive advantage.302  Any policy discriminating against 
                                               
 297. See supra Section V.A.2. 
 298. See Saint v. Neb. Sch. Activities Ass’n, 684 F. Supp. 626, 629 (D. Neb. 1988) 
(wrestling); Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1031 (W.D. Mo. 
1983) (football). 
 299. See Pennsylvania v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 334 A.2d 839, 842 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1975). 
 300. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542–45 (1996) (striking down the 
Virginia Military Institute’s admissions policy because Virginia’s justification for 
excluding all women did not meet the “exceedingly persuasive” standard necessary for 
sex-based classifications). 
 301. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (holding that denial 
of government benefits to hippies in particular is unconstitutional). 
 302. See GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 61, at 16; see also supra Section I.C. 
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trans girls who are undergoing hormone therapy likely reflects the type 
of impermissible animus the Supreme Court prohibits.303 
2. Fully inclusive policies 
Fully inclusive policies, like those found in Connecticut and 
Washington state, that permit all trans student-athletes to participate 
on teams consistent with their gender identity are legally valid.  
Ensuring that trans students feel welcome participating in 
interscholastic athletics is a legitimate state objective, and fully 
inclusive policies are rationally related to pursuing that goal.  A 
constitutional challenge by a cis girl who was denied a spot on a 
competitive team or by a girl from an opposing school who would 
compete against a trans girl would likely fail.  High school athletic 
associations have a legitimate reason to sacrifice “perfect competition” 
in the service of greater inclusion.304  If the sport in question is a 
contact sport, a female plaintiff may plausibly argue that a fully 
inclusive policy puts her in danger because it forces her to spar against 
an opponent with a male body; however, a court would still likely find 
the policy rationally related to achieving legitimate educational 
objectives. 
3. Partially inclusive policies 
Finally, partially inclusive policies, like those implemented in Idaho 
and Ohio, are constitutionally valid.  The justification for allowing FTM 
trans boys to compete against cis boys is thoroughly addressed in Section 
V.B.1.  Under rational basis review, a policy that requires an MTF trans 
girl to undergo hormone therapy for one year before competing against 
other girls would likely survive constitutional scrutiny. 
Affected trans girls are not completely denied access to athletics; 
they simply are limited to the boys’ team.  Even though many doctors 
assert that treating a trans girl as female in some situations but not 
others is detrimental to her health and well-being,305 state officials may 
rationally weigh the concerns of her cis opponents more heavily.  After 
reading about a trans athlete like Andraya Yearwood besting her cis 
                                               
 303. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (reasoning that a policy with 
motives “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects” will fail 
rational basis review). 
 304. Shell, supra note 128, at 1057. 
 305. See Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 74, at 298 (“Not allowing [trans 
girls] to play on sports teams consistent with their gender identity will only increase 
feelings of isolation and despair.”). 
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competitors at the Connecticut championship track meet, athletic 
association representatives from other states may reasonably respond 
by implementing rules that prevent trans girls who have received no 
medical intervention from participating on all-girl teams.  Ensuring 
competitive fairness and reducing the potential risk of injury are 
legitimate state objectives,306 and requiring that trans girls undergo 
one year of hormone therapy before playing on girls’ teams is 
rationally related to pursuing those goals.  Courts have upheld 
discriminatory athletic policies that promote fair play and safety in the 
past.307  A partially inclusive policy is reasonably aligned with Title IX’s 
purpose—preserving the integrity of female athletics.308 
Even if the policy can withstand a facial challenge, a particular trans 
girl who is of comparable size and ability level to her cis girl peers may 
successfully challenge the regulation as applied to her.309  To prevent 
this, high school athletic associations with partially inclusive policies 
should include an exception similar to the one in Ohio that permits a 
trans girl who has not received any medical intervention to play on the 
girls’ team provided she can demonstrate that she possesses no physical 
advantage and poses no undue safety risk to cis girls.310 
CONCLUSION 
Although both fully inclusive and partially inclusive policies are 
consistent with the Constitution and Title IX, athletic policy decision 
makers should deeply consider which values they want to promote.  
State officials need to balance concerns over fair competition and 
safety with acknowledging the dignity and well-being of trans students. 
                                               
 306. See Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 307. See id. at 1034–35 (holding that school policy prohibiting nineteen-year-old 
students from playing high school sports is rationally related to reducing competitive 
advantage and protecting younger athletes from harm).  But see Dennin v. Conn. 
Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, 669 (D. Conn. 1996), 
vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that, despite state age restriction, a 
nineteen-year-old student with Down Syndrome could participate on the swim team in 
which he was the slowest swimmer). 
 308. See supra Section I.A. 
 309. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) 
(upholding in general a zoning ordinance that requires a special use permit for homes 
for the mentally disabled but invaliding the ordinance as applied to the Featherstone 
home because the residents of that particular facility did not threaten a legitimate 
interest of the city). 
 310. OHIO POLICY, supra note 136, at 3. 
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A policy that requires a trans girl to undergo hormone therapy for a 
year before competing against other girls might unduly burden a student 
who cannot afford expensive hormone treatments.311  Such a policy might 
also pressure a trans girl to pursue medical intervention that she might 
not otherwise desire.312  Partially inclusive athletic policies will prevent 
a trans girl who decides not to undergo hormone therapy, either because 
of prohibitive costs or a wish to maintain her natural hormonal levels, 
from making a full social transition if she is barred from playing on 
female sports teams.  The full social transition is integral to a trans 
individual’s emotional health.313  Furthermore, a rule that bars trans girls 
who have not undergone hormone treatment from playing on girls’ teams 
may effectively “out” a trans student to her classmates. 
The NCAA model is constitutional, but a more trans-friendly 
approach might be a better fit for secondary schools.  High school 
athletic associations need to decide whether preventing athletes like 
Yearwood from winning girls’ state championships is worth the 
emotional toll placed on trans girls who are prohibited from playing 
sports with their female classmates.  After losing the 100-meter dash to 
Yearwood, Kate Hall, a junior who had won the event the previous year, 
was noticeably disappointed.314  As Hall fought back tears, she told a 
reporter, “I can’t really say what I want to say, but there’s not much I 
can do about it . . . .  You can’t blame anyone . . . .  From what I know 
[Yearwood] is really nice and that’s all that matters.  She’s not rude 
and obnoxious.”315  Hall, through her grace and composure in defeat, 
proves that, although at times painful, fully inclusive policies are 
necessary to affirm the dignity of trans adolescents.  This issue is bigger 
than one athlete or one track meet.  Interscholastic sports should be 
in service of larger educational goals, and there is no more important 
lesson than teaching young people that their trans classmates deserve 
the opportunity to fully live their truth, including playing sports 
consistent with their gender identity. 
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